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ABSTRACT 
THE COLOR OF LABOR: THE CHANGING RACIAL AND SPATIAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF MIDDLE-SKILL EMPLOYMENT 
by 
Justin R. Young 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2011 
Research regarding the growing gap between rich and poor has not wholly 
considered the dissolution of America's middle-skill jobs (occupations that require 
training/education beyond the high-school level, but less than a four-year degree). I draw 
on data from the CPS (1990 to 2009) to uncover the extent to which low, middle, and 
high-skill employment are distributed among white and nonwhite workers in rural, 
suburban and urban regions, and how this distribution has changed since 1990. Blacks 
and Hispanics remain overrepresented in low-skill employment and underrepresented in 
high-skill labor, although blacks made the most significant percentage gains in high-skill 
employment since 1990, particularly in the suburbs. Hispanics and rural Americans are 
most likely to report middle-skill employment, while suburbanites are least likely to 
report employment in these jobs. The Great Recession expedited middle-skill labor's 
decline. While both low and high-skill labor increased during this time, high-skill 




Sociological research has long stressed the importance of a strong middle class. 
Not only has its presence been correlated with overall economic wellbeing, but literature 
also suggests that it is necessary for robust civic life and political pluralism (Duncan 
1999; Blanchard and Matthews 2006). Such aspects of social life may be in danger, 
however. New evidence suggests that the US is at risk of losing its middle-skill jobs— 
those that require training beyond secondary school but less than a four-year college 
degree—and becoming bifurcated between low and high-skill employment. The loss of 
such jobs comes, not coincidentally, at a time when the gap between rich and poor 
continues to widen. As Fischer and Mattson (2009) note, "From 1970 to 2005, the gap 
between the highest income households, and the lowest income households.. .grew from a 
ratio of 9:1 to a ratio of 11:1" (p. 442). A more recent analysis found that middle-incomes 
have remained stagnant since the late 1980s while incomes of the top one-percent of 
earners have grown by more than a third (Saez 2010). 
In the midst of this growing economic uncertainty, though, another trend has been 
unfolding. Blacks and other minorities across the US have made significant economic 
and political gains since the Civil Rights era. Despite such advances, however, 
minorities—blacks in particular—continue to lag behind their white peers on a number of 
measures, including wealth and income (Conley 1999; Shapiro 2004), as well as housing 
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(Massey and Denton 1993) and educational achievement (Caldas and Bankston 2005; 
Massey et al. 2009; Woltors 2009). 
Access to skilled employment plays a critical role in this ongoing race-inequality 
narrative. Blacks, for instance, made momentous gains in skilled employment since the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act, a phenomenon that Wilson (1978) was among the first to 
observe. Since the economic restructuring that began in the 1960s, however, relatively 
well-paying manufacturing occupations and other jobs for those who do not pursue a 
college education have trickled out of the American economy (Bluestone and Harrison 
1982; Harrison and Bluestone 1988; Doeringer and Piore 1971). If such a decline is 
significant enough, it could be more widely felt among nonwhites, who tend to fare worse 
in times of economic downturns (such as the current recession; see Rugh and Massey 
2010) than their white counterparts. 
Scholars and policy analysts currently debate whether US labor markets are at risk 
of becoming bifurcated between low-skill employment for the less educated and high-
skill employment for those able to obtain at least a four-year degree (Autor 2010; Holzer 
and Lerman 2007). The loss of middle-skill jobs may be particularly detrimental to 
minorities, especially black workers, who historically were segmented into the least 
skilled of occupations (Barrett and Roediger 1997). It was not until the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act that blacks began to make significant gains in skilled employment—a 
trend that has increased their middle-class standing (Wilson 1978). Rural blacks also 
suffer lower levels of education, particularly in the south (Lyson and Falk 1988; see also 
Duncan 1999), further concentrating them in low-skill employment. By discerning the 
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demographic composition of middle-skill jobholders, we can gain further insight into this 
phenomenon. 
Examples of middle-skill occupations range from extractive positions such as coal 
mining, to manufacturing careers provided by the auto industry, or a number of vocations 
in the healthcare field, including medical assistants and surgical technicians. According 
to Demos, a public-policy think-tank, more than a quarter of the US middle class lacks 
some of the training required for high-skill employment (requiring at least a four-year 
degree), further diminishing their financial security (Wheary, Shapiro, and Draut 2007:2). 
Skill, although correlated with education, is quite distinct from the latter. Whereas 
education describes the type and extent of preparation one has undertaken, skill refers to 
the preparation required by a particular position. For instance, a bank teller with a four-
year degree—though he or she possesses the education for high-skilled employment— 
remains classified as a low-skill worker (an education-occupation mismatch that gives 
rise to underemployment). The same is true of a social worker who might have gained 
employment as a child welfare advocate with only a two-year degree in the 1960s or 
1970s—though the job now requires at least a four-year college degree. 
Aside from the detriment that an impending polarization might have for 
nonwhites, we must also take into account the distribution of such a trend on spatial 
grounds as well. The scholarship differentiating rural and urban America is not only 
plentiful, but suggests that rural labor markets are quite distinct from their metropolitan 
counterparts, lagging behind on a number of economic indicators, making these regions 
more susceptible to the negative impacts of industrial restructuring (Falk and Lyson 
1988; Falk and Lobao 2003; Lyson and Falk 1993; RSS Task Force 1993). 
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While middle-skill employment does not account for the entirety of the middle 
class, it solidifies this particular socioeconomic standing for many. About a quarter of 
middle-class Americans depend on such jobs (Autor 2010; Wheary, Shapiro, and Draut 
2007). Whether or not significant gains in middle-skill employment among minorities 
explain the rise of the nonwhite middle class, though, remains to be seen. If the growing 
representation of minorities within the middle class is linked largely to their gains in 
middle-skill employment, as Wilson (1978) partly suggests, then the minority middle-
class may be especially endangered by this labor market bifurcation. 
Autor (2010), among others, argues that middle-skill jobs have been on the 
decline since the 1970s, and more readily so since the 1990s. Polarization theorists 
contend that industrial restructuring and the increased globalization to which it is tied 
have played a large role in the reduction of these jobs (Autor 2010; Harrison and 
Bluestone 1988; Hudson 2007; Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000). Others, such as 
Holzer and Lerman (2007) assert that middle-skill employment is not necessarily on the 
decline, nor is the US economy at risk of becoming bifurcated. Rather, labor markets are 
becoming diversified in different ways, relying less on manufacturing and other 
traditional blue-collar jobs, and more so on middle-skill occupations in other industries, 
including healthcare and construction. 
We know little, however, about the racial and spatial compositions of middle-skill 
workers. Both sides of the debate have largely failed to account for differences between 
whites and nonwhites in the US labor force, as well as between rural and urban labor 
markets. If, as Autor suggests, a labor-market bifurcation is underway, then such a trend 
will have graver consequences for those concentrated within such employment. On the 
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other hand, if the secure state of middle-skill employment calls for increased training to 
ensure that a workforce is available for these jobs (Holzer and Lerman 2007; Holzer 
2010), such policies and training programs will have to take into consideration the 
populations that will most benefit (i.e., those most likely to hold such positions). 
In light of the distinctions between whites and nonwhites, as well as variation 
between urban and rural labor markets, I pose the following questions: 1) Are blacks and 
Hispanics more likely to hold middle-skill employment compared to their white peers? 2) 
Are rural workers, in comparison to their urban and suburban counterparts, more likely to 
hold middle-skill employment? And finally 3) To the extent that labor-market bifurcation 
exists, has such a trend been more pronounced among nonwhites or those in rural areas? 
To answer these questions, I draw on data from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) between 1992 and 2009 to provide a descriptive analysis examining differences 
between whites and nonwhites, as well as rural, suburban and urban populations. Prior to 
this analysis, however, I discuss theories of labor market bifurcation. I then elaborate on 
gains made by nonwhites in education—a factor underlying skilled employment—before 
discussing the extent of industrial transformation across the US since the 1960s, paying 
particular attention to its consequences for nonwhites (especially blacks, given their 
higher rates of labor market and residential segregation) across both urban and rural 
areas. I also examine literature pertaining to minority access to skilled employment (and 
barriers to it) throughout the twentieth century. Lastly, placing the rise of high-skill 
employment in context, I provide a brief overview of expanding credentialism—the 
growing emphasis that employers are placing on a formal, college education—is 




Labor Market Diversification or Economic Polarization? 
Two competing theories encapsulate the current labor market bifurcation debate. 
The first of these suggests that middle-skill jobs are not disappearing. Rather, certain 
industries that offer middle-skill employment, such as healthcare or construction, are 
expanding as others, including manufacturing and resource extraction, decline (Holzer 
and Lerman 2007). In largely rural states such as Wisconsin, alternative energy or green-
based jobs are also on the rise (Biroonak and Kaleba 2010; Mauldin, Mayo, and Breen 
2009). In addition, although many middle-skill industries are not expanding or creating 
new jobs, openings will arise as baby-boomers retire in the coming years. According to 
Holzer and Lerman (2007), employment availability will far outpace the number of 
workers qualified for such positions. Research that fails to examine middle-skill job 
markets by industry, they contend, falls short of capturing important labor market 
nuances, particularly an increase in employment requiring a two-year degree. 
Middle-skill jobs themselves make up a greater portion of the US labor market 
than either low- or high-skill employment. In 2006, slightly less than half of all US 
workers reported being employed in middle-skill occupations (Holzer and Lerman 2007). 
Research from the National Skills Coalition—a group seeking to enumerate the status of 
labor markets across the country and improve the training of the American labor force— 
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notes that a shortage of eligible middle-skill workers exists and is expected to rise as 
fewer seek training beyond the high-school level (Biroonak and Kaleba 2010; Holzer 
2010). An emphasis placed on high-skill preparation and obtaining a four-year college 
degree rather than technical or community college training, the coalition asserts, help 
drive such shortages. 
Although figures elaborated on by this school of thought do not necessarily 
indicate that labor market polarization is existent, they nonetheless signify an overall 
decrease in the middle-skill workforce since the mid-1980s, accompanied by slight 
increases in low- and high-skill employment. While forty-eight percent of contemporary 
workers were employed in middle-skill jobs four years ago, this figure represents a seven 
percent decrease since 1986 (Holzer and Lerman 2007). Employment in high-skill 
industries rose approximately six percent during this same twenty-year period, from just 
under thirty percent to 35 percent; low-skill employment also increased, though only by 
one percent. What is more, the number employed in middle-skill jobs is expected to 
decline another three percent by 2017 (Holzer and Lerman 2007). Whether or not this 
phenomenon is due to a lack of eligible workers or an overall decline, though, is 
uncertain. Diversification research, as I will refer to it, suggests that it is the former which 
accounts for an apparent polarization, a trend that this body of literature argues has been 
exaggerated. 
Polarization theories, on the other hand, suggest that middle-skill employment in 
the US is, in fact, evaporating, being replaced by both low-skill and high-skill 
employment. Autor (2010) contends that middle-skill employment has been on the 
decline especially since the 1990s, when occupations structured around "routine" tasks 
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(Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003) were either heavily outsourced to foreign markets or 
increasingly eliminated due to technological advances. What is more, such technological 
advances increase the ability to offshore lesser-skilled positions, an interaction that 
further compounds the decline of middle-skill job availability. Over time, these middle-
skill jobs have been replaced with low-skill, low-paying and high-skill, high-paying 
positions. 
A related school of research suggests that "good" jobs and "bad" jobs are coming 
to define the US economy. While not directly comparable to high- and low-skill 
occupations, these good and bad jobs share a number of attributes. Kalleberg, Reskin, and 
Hudson (2000) found a positive correlation between non-standard employment and "bad" 
job characteristics, including low pay and few (if any) benefits, features that also tend to 
characterize low-skill occupations (Autor 2010). Standard employment, on the other 
hand, is typically accompanied by greater rates of pay as well as increased access to 
fringe benefits (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000). The US economy has become 
increasingly bifurcated between these good and bad or standard and nonstandard 
occupations since the 1970s (Hudson 2007). 
This polarization phenomenon is not uniquely an American dilemma. A number 
of industrialized nations reportedly experienced comparable losses, particularly as labor 
markets become increasingly susceptible to the impacts of globalization (Osterman 
1999). Foster and Wolfson (2010) uncovered a similar, although less substantial, pattern 
with regard to middle-skill employment losses in Canada. Nations throughout the 
European Union also experienced this economic trend beginning in the early 1990s, 
lasting more than a decade (Autor 2010). 
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The Racial Segregation of Skill 
No analysis of skilled employment in the US would be sufficient without taking 
into account the long history of white monopolization of skilled, better paid jobs, 
particularly in the manufacturing and production sectors. For the greater half of the 
1900s, minorities were blocked from gaining significant entry to skilled employment 
(Brown 1998, 2000). Unions aimed at keeping nonwhites from garnering the experience 
required for skilled jobs, as well as apprenticeships and training programs that would 
result in enhanced access to skilled employment. During first quarter of the twentieth 
century, for instance, unions utilized a number of tactics to prevent minority integration. 
According to Brown and Brueggemann (1997), while some unions "explicitly prohibited 
black membership, many more did not actively recruit blacks" (p. 54). 
Even during the course of the Great Migration—when blacks left southern, 
agriculturally oriented markets for the industrial sectors of the north—skilled segregation 
within the industries themselves persisted. As Brown and Boswell (1995) note, work 
performed by blacks typically paid poorly, required little-to-no skill or training and was 
more often than not the most physically demanding and life-threatening. When blacks did 
manage to make substantial gains in skilled employment, it was often under the guise of 
strikebreaking, furthering the animosity between blacks and their unionized white peers 
(ibid; see also Brown and Brueggemann 1997). As Wilson (1978) points out, "The 
relegation of blacks to the least desirable jobs in industry helped to perpetuate the 
traditional separation of jobs into racial categories" (p. 73). 
The experience of such economic rancor, however, was not unique to blacks. 
Asians, Hispanics and particular subsets of white ethnic groups also faced labor-market 
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discrimination, although their experiences differed somewhat, and dissipated more 
rapidly, than their black counterparts, largely due to the lack of coerced migration 
(Blauner 1972) and greater ease of assimilating into the WASP (white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant) society (ibid; Barrett and Roediger 1997; Jacobson 1998; Lieberson 1980). 
Despite the commonly held assumption that white immigrants faced animosity at levels 
equivalent to that of blacks, Lieberson (1980) notes that blacks faced more widespread 
and varied forms of discrimination. He goes on to explain: 
Witness, for example, the differences in the disposition to openly ban 
blacks from unions at the turn of the century.. .the greater concentration of 
blacks in 1900 in service occupations and their smaller numbers in 
manufacturing and mechanical jobs...the higher black death rates in the 
North.. .and even the greater segregation of blacks with respect to avenues 
of eminence open to them (p. 383). 
The concept of split labor markets further helps to clarify the racial animosity that 
permeated much of American labor in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Split labor markets are generally regarded as racial/ethnic divides in which "groups with 
different labor costs are forced to compete for the same jobs at different wage levels" 
(Boswell and Jorjani 1988). Such divides were common within low-paying labor markets 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and their effects continued to be felt to 
this day, particularly insofar as inequality is passed from one generation to the next. Male 
Asian workers, for instance, continue to earn significantly less than their white non-
Hispanic peers, despite their high levels of education (Kim and Sakamoto 2011). 
Private-sector racial tensions and discrimination aside, even the employment 
programs of the New Deal were highly racialized, as Quadagno notes (1994). As the 
necessity for skilled workers increased rapidly during and immediately following the 
Second World War, minorities managed to make some gains, although they were not 
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necessarily long lasting. The animosity toward minorities that government policies 
helped to foster was replicated in the 1960s and '70s, when the War on Poverty hoped to 
tackle racial inequalities via job training programs (ibid: 61-87; see also Quadagno 1992). 
Minorities in contemporary labor markets continue to be dealt an unfair shake in 
their attempts to gain access to skilled employment, in part a consequence of past 
discriminatory barriers, but also due to a lack of quality education (an element I elaborate 
on shortly) and residential segregation in areas where such opportunities are unavailable 
(Massey and Denton 1993). In earlier decades, private practices in lending and 
government institutionalized redlining helped to ensure that blacks could not follow the 
jobs, even if they were financially able to do so (ibid). Massey and Denton found that the 
legacy of such practices continues to influence minorities in their search for employment. 
Discriminatory practices in hiring and firing continue to persist in contemporary 
labor markets (Holzer 1998; Kaufman 2002; Mong and Roscigno 2009). This is 
particularly true today in an era of color-blind racism (Bonilla-Silva 2010). Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2004) conducted a field experiment utilizing matched resumes sent to 
employers who sought to fill entry-level positions. Some resumes were sent with white-
sounding names (i.e., Emily and Greg) and others with black-sounding names (i.e., 
Lakisha and Jamal). Resumes that included white-names were 50 percent more likely 
than resumes with black names to receive interview requests from employers. Moreover, 
when the researchers improved the quality of these resumes (in the form of more skills 
and credentials), those with white-names received even more callbacks, while those with 
black-names saw no increase in their rate of callback. 
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Pager (2007) took Bertrand and Mullainathan's analysis a step further, utilizing 
paired actors—all males, one black the other white—who matched on numerous aspects 
of personality, physique, etc., and sent on hundreds of interviews for entry-level positions 
with identical resumes. The only difference between the interviewees (other than race): 
one member of each pair was randomly assigned a criminal record. Pager found that 
black applicants without a criminal record were no more likely than whites with a 
criminal record to be offered a job. When the study was replicated in New York City 
(Pager, Western and Bonikowski 2009), researchers uncovered similar results. That is, 
black and Hispanic applicants were offered jobs or called back for second interviews at 
half the rate of whites. 
Moss and Tilly (2001) also documented numerous mechanisms—some overtly 
racial and others less so—that employers utilize during the hiring process. While 
employers often act rationally, screening out applicants who lack the skills and education 
required for the job, they also make use of "'skill' distinctions [that] often incorporate 
racially discriminatory attitudes" (p. 43). Many employers interviewed, for instance, held 
the view that minorities, especially black males, lack motivation. Such attitudes, the 
researchers found, resulted in a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy in which nonwhites were 
relegated to low-skill jobs that offer low pay and no advancement opportunities, neither 
of which would help any worker, regardless of race, end their so-called "dependence" on 
government assistance. In comparison, employers often extolled more positive views of 
Asians and Hispanics, resulting in their greater representation in the workplace, 
particularly in skilled occupations that offered room for advancement (see especially p. 
113-124). In some cases, employers might exclude residents of entire inner-city 
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neighborhoods from employment opportunities altogether. Anderson observed that this 
phenomenon (1999) arises partly from the fronts that "decent" inner-city residents utilize 
in attempting to ensure that they themselves do not become the victims of violent crime: 
Such cultural displays in turn make young people even less employable. 
Beset with negative stereotypes, employers sometimes discriminate 
against whole census tracts or zip codes where impoverished people live. 
The decent people are strongly associated with the indecent people, and 
the employers often do not worry about making distinctions. They just 
want to avoid the whole troublesome situation, selecting whites over 
blacks (p. 113). 
The inner-city struggle for survival and freedom from victimization thus sets into 
motion a series of everyday attitudes and practices that some use to ensure wellbeing and 
that come to define residents' everyday lived experiences. However, one could not expect 
an employer to be aware of the fact that subtle, yet critical interpersonal cues (e.g., 
maintaining eye contact and not giving simple yes/no responses; ibid) are typically not 
part of inner-city residents' practical knowledge. More nuanced factors also have a heavy 
hand in influencing modern-day minority employment (or lack of it) in skilled 
occupations. In their comparison to females and Hispanics, McDonald, Lin and Ao 
(2009) found that white males tend to have greater access to skilled employment via a 
number of interpersonal/informal social networks that women and minorities do not 
possess. What is more, given their structural positions within labor markets themselves, 
nonwhites and lower-paid workers in general (particularly in urban areas) often lack the 
"formal channels" that gains in skilled occupations sometimes necessitate (Elliott 2000). 
Racial Disparities in Education 
Education disparities operate as yet another barrier for minorities in gaining 
access to skilled (especially high-skilled) employment. Given that education underlies 
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access to skilled employment, how nonwhites have fared with respect to this institution is 
critical to understanding occupational disparities. Although blacks and Hispanics have 
made substantial gains in both the quality and quantity of their educational experiences, 
they continue to lag behind on numerous educational measures (Caldas and Bankston 
2005)—a finding that speaks partly to the quality of the education available to nonwhites. 
Wealth disparities between whites and nonwhites capture this phenomenon (Conley 
1999) and, as Shapiro (2004) notes, such differences are partly driven by this educational 
gap: 
Disadvantaged children start school with significantly lower cognitive 
skills than other children. Given this, one might think that poor children, 
those from black and Hispanic families and from families where parents 
are less educated, need high-quality schools. Instead, they get just the 
opposite (p. 144). 
US Census data illustrate these points. Blacks, for instance, obtain four-year 
college degrees at slightly more than half the rate of whites (24 percent of whites, 
compared to 14.3 percent of blacks), while Hispanics attain such degrees an even lower 
rate (roughly 10 percent) (US Census Bureau 2000a: Table 2). In comparison to whites, 
the rate at which Asians pursue and obtain four-year degrees is considerably high (44 
percent). Such trends only help to solidify the underrepresentation of blacks and 
Hispanics in high-skilled employment. 
A similar trend arises with respect to the education required for middle-skill 
employment, namely two-year degrees and some college—education that is critical in 
obtaining positions in expanding middle-skill industries, such as education and healthcare 
(Holzer and Lerman 2007). It should be remembered, though, that significant on-the-job 
training is also required for many middle-skill positions, a facet for which education 
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alone cannot account. However, given that blacks and Hispanics, as well as other 
nonwhites (e.g., Native Americans and Alaskan Natives) experience higher high school 
dropout rates in comparison to whites and Asians (US Census 2000b), their likelihood of 
obtaining either middle or high-skilled employment is further diminished (see also 
Zamani-Gallaher and Polite 2010). According to the National Center for Education 
Statistics, whites in 2008 had an attrition rate of nearly 5 percent, whereas the dropout 
rate for blacks was nearly 10 percent (US Department of Education 2010). Hispanics had 
the highest attrition rate, at just over 18 percent (ibid). Even at the college-level, a similar 
pattern persists, with blacks and Hispanics substantially more likely to abandon their 
pursuit of higher education (Massey et al. 2009). 
Quantity of education alone is not to blame, however. Prior to the federal 
intervention of the 1960s and '70s, the segregated education endured by nonwhites (more 
specifically, blacks) ensured their place in the non-skilled labor force. Government 
interventions (chiefly busing), though, have largely failed in their attempts at instilling 
greater racial equity via the education system (Caldas and Bankston 2005; Woltors 2009). 
The drastic economic decline of the inner-city, coupled with the outmigration of the 
higher-paid urban populous, also explains the poor quality of education that many 
nonwhite students have available to them: "the more revenue lost in income and property 
taxes from the exodus of a higher-paid labor force and industry.. .the less money there is 
available for adequate police, education [emphasis added], recreation, and fire 
protection" (Wilson 1978: 115). 
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Credentialism and the Race for Higher Education 
These disparities between whites and nonwhites have taken place within a much 
greater context of an education race to the top. Just as manufacturing and other blue-
collar opportunities began to dissipate, young Americans across the US began to gain 
greater access to higher education. Nearly thirty percent of those in their mid-twenties 
reported earning at least a bachelors degree in 2007, for instance, "a five-fold increase in 
college attainment since the Census Bureau first collected educational attainment data in 
1940" (Crissey 2009: 1). Along with this increase has come a rise in employment 
requiring such credentials (i.e., high-skill employment). 
A number of factors explain not only this greater access, but also the prominence 
placed on attaining a college degree in contemporary America—an emphasis that some, 
such as Holzer and Lerman 2007, contend has resulted in placing the state of middle-skill 
occupations out of sight of policymakers. Broadly speaking, cultural scholars such as 
Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) argue that systems of educational stratification (including 
credentialism) serve to maintain class inequality, an observation that might hold more 
sway in today's increasingly diversified economy. Bowles and Gintis (1976) reached a 
similar conclusion in their analysis of education and capitalism. Higher education has 
become, they assert, merely another institution by which inequalities are reproduced, 
wage-labor regulated, and the capitalist class system maintained. 
As labor markets became more stratified and specialized over the course of the 
last fifty years, employers have also become more concerned with hiring workers who 
can accomplish their tasks with little oversight. Degrees, in part, help to serve this 
function, at least to the extent that employers perceive college-educated applicants to be 
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more dependable (Brown 2001; Thurow 1975; Wilensky and Lawrence 1979). Economic 
organizations themselves have also been susceptible to the increased bureaucratization 
predicted by Weber (1946; see discussion in Brown 2001). Thus, credentialism itself 
could be interpreted as a response to the increasingly inescapable iron cage of 
bureaucracy in which "job descriptions of skills in positions are significantly outcomes of 
organizational politics that ought not to be taken literally" (Brown 2001: 25). 
Despite what the terminology of low, middle and high-skill indicates, and as this 
previous quote alludes, those who have obtained four-year degrees might be no more 
skilled than their middle-skill counterparts (see, for instance, Berg 1971), the latter of 
whom more often pursue training specific to the occupation in which they intend to seek 
employment (e.g., surgical technology, welding technology, culinary arts or pharmacy 
technology). In other words, a worker holding a PhD, for instance, could not take the 
place of a skilled carpenter, the latter of whom would only be designated as holding a 
"middle-skill" occupation (and who in most circles is regarded as less prestigious). 
The growing access to higher education as a gateway to better income and quality 
of life should not be understated, nor should its growth be deemed responsible for the 
decline of middle-skill incomes (a causal link which has yet to be established). Evidence 
increasingly suggests, however, that the college-educated are pursuing such credentials 
for credentials-sake without necessarily gaining the skills associated with such an 
education. 
In their longitudinal study of roughly 2,300 college students, Arum and Roska 
(2011) found that over a third of college graduates are leaving their educational 
institutions degrees-in-hand, but without having shown improvement in "soft" skills like 
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critical thinking or writing since freshman year. The authors conclude that students and 
their parents, as well as faculty and the ever-expanding administrative staff, have 
participated at least somewhat in the practices that have given rise to the widespread 
inadequacy of higher-learning institutions. Their interviewees, they note, "often 
embraced a 'credentialist-collegiate orientation' that focused on earning a degree with as 
little effort as possible" (p. 70; see also Labaree 1999 for an in-depth discussion of this 
phenomenon). The industrial decline within which credentialism has expanded has 
affected not only minorities who are less likely to have obtained such credentials, but 
workers in US labor markets in general, a subject to which I now turn. 
Industrial Restructuring 
Labor markets in the US and across the globe have undergone significant 
transformations over the last fifty years. Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
manufacturing and other blue-collar jobs that secured the middle-class standing of many 
began to trickle out of the US economy, replaced overtime by service-sector and other 
forms of nonstandard employment (Best 1993; Falk and Lyson 1993; RSS Task Force 
1993; Singelmann and Browning 1980). For instance, up until the late 1970s, 
manufacturing employment appeared to be expanding, but beneath this overall growth 
was to be found a major manufacturing decline in areas where the industry was key to 
economic prosperity, namely in a region that has since been dubbed the Rust Belt (Sassen 
1990: 468-469). Against the backdrop of this decline, minorities were especially likely to 
witness what gains they made slip away. Bluestone and Harrison (1982: 54-55) briefly 
elaborated on the detriment of deindustrialization for the nonwhite population: 
To add to the inequity burden, nonwhite minorities also tend to be 
concentrated in industries that have borne the brunt of [these] 
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closings... The dream of jobs with high wages and decent fringe benefits 
that once lured blacks to the North has turned into a nightmare for those 
who now face termination in the once bustling factories of the industrial 
Midwest. 
Over a million of these manufacturing jobs were lost between the late 1970s to the 
mid-1980s alone (Sassen 1990: 467). Although the effects of outsourcing and 
restructuring were felt less widely during the 1980s (Chevan and Stokes 2000: 373), the 
overall share of manufacturing and other well-paying occupations continued to decline 
(DiPrete 1993; Mishel and Frankel 1991). Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
further illustrate America's waning stake in manufacturing employment. The trend line in 
Figure 1 below shows the decrease during the latter half of the twentieth century. The 
scope of the industry's abatement becomes even clearer when considering manufacturing 
as a percent of the total workforce. Its share of overall employment has declined roughly 
51 percent, from nearly a quarter in 1969 to just over 11 percent in 2000 (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis: Regional Economic Information System), although this 40 
percentage-point drop was due not only to a decline in manufacturing, but also growth of 
other industries, particularly those in the service-sector. 
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Figure 1. Full and Part-Time 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Regional Eocnomic Information System: 1969-2000. 
The industrial restructuring responsible for much of this decline (Bluestone and 
Harris 1982) increased at an even faster rate during the 1990s, as Autor (2010) notes, and 
low-skill employment expanded rapidly (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2003). Thus, those 
who do not see adequate rises in their yearly incomes are likely forced even further down 
the economic ladder. Among a sample of Indiana workers, Starks (2003) found that most 
expressed uncertainty toward their socioeconomic security, suggesting that many 
employed in contemporary labor markets are aware of the impacts of this economic 
restructuring, feeling its effects firsthand. 
Today, nonstandard employment—that which often lacks fringe benefits, is 
typified by part-time work, irregular hours and is often contingent in nature—is 
becoming ever more common as firms seek to maximize their abilities to lay off workers 
to remain economically viable in the global market (Osterman 1999). Income growth 
patterns reflect this phenomenon. Beginning in the 1980s, incomes of the top quartile 
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have grown substantially while the rest have remained relatively unchanged (Frank 2000; 
US Committee on Education and Labor 2008). In addition, fuel, healthcare and other 
living expenses continue to rise in cost as incomes remain stagnant and the value of the 
US dollar declines (Frank 2000). Neither the expansion of nonstandard employment nor 
the effects of industrial decline have been randomly distributed across the US, however. 
Research suggests that rural residents and inner-city minorities are two groups that have 
been especially hard hit by these economic disruptions. 
Rural, Urban and Suburban Workers 
Industrial restructuring has perhaps taken a larger toll on nonurban labor markets 
(Falk and Lobao 2003; McLaughlin 2002). Rural America has long lagged behind the 
urban US on a number of economic indicators, a factor likely worsened by increased 
globalization and industrial shifts. As Falk and Lobao (2003) note, "Rural areas tend to 
be more vulnerable than urban areas to the detrimental effects of economic restructuring 
owing to their less diverse industrial structures, lower household incomes, and human 
capital attributes such as lower educational attainment" (p. 153). 
Factors such as these often work hand in hand when it comes to the structure of 
contemporary rural labor markets. It should come as no surprise that rural regions 
historically have been more susceptible to influxes of low-skill occupations (see, for 
instance, Winson and Leach 2002), in part due to its less-educated populous. Given that 
more-educated populations often account for a substantial amount of nonurban out-
migration (Carr and Kefalas 2009; Domina 2006), much of rural America has been left 
with a labor force more readily available to hold the low-skill, low-paying jobs that often 
replaced their better paying, higher-skilled counterparts (Falk and Lyson 1988; Gorham 
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1992; Lyson and Falk 1993). In the south, for instance, technology jobs requiring a more 
highly skilled labor force flooded urban areas, whereas firms seeking nonunionized 
workforces took advantage of rural counties' lack of economic diversity and less-skilled 
labor pool (Falk and Lyson 1988). What is more, given that rural blacks are typically less 
educated than those in urban areas (Dill and Williams 1992: 99; see also Johnson and 
Lichter 2007), one might expect a potential labor market bifurcation to be most 
pronounced among this demographic. 
More recently, McLaughlin and Coleman-Jensen (2008) demonstrated that 
nonstandard employment is more ubiquitous in rural America. They found that whites, 
however, rather than minorities, were most likely to hold nonstandard employment. They 
also found no significant regional differences (i.e., metro, suburban, and nonmetro) with 
respect to nonstandard employment among non-Hispanic black workers in their sample 
(p. 643: Table 2). 
Rural workers must also confront the effects of monopolized labor markets. 
Duncan's (1999) analysis of three rural communities indicates that powerful economic 
actors can have a substantial influence on the diversity of local labor markets, limiting the 
entry of other potential industries that threaten their own economic prowess. 
Furthermore, the occupational opportunities of residents in these communities were often 
constrained, in part, by their lack of education. In addition, residents who attempted to 
shake up the status quo faced blacklisting, while those whose familial backgrounds were 
labeled indolent or unfit for employment frequently were denied access to better-paying 
jobs altogether. Race played a particularly critical role within these power structures, 
blacks were often shuffled into low-skill, low-wage seasonal occupations. Furthermore, 
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"the extraordinary power that employers had over workers and that whites had over 
blacks has maintained this inequality and long-term poverty" in these rural communities 
(p. 188). 
More broadly, though, rural economies tend to experience less growth during 
times of economic upswing, such as the boom of the 1990s (USDA 2002), while the 
effects of the mortgage crisis that preceded the current economic recession have been 
more widely felt in rural areas (USDA 2009) and more harmful to nonwhites (Massey 
and Rugh 2010). Economic development also tends to be concentrated in areas whose 
populations possess the skills and education (i.e., college degrees) for high-skilled 
employment. This may be particularly detrimental in the rural south where, as Lyson and 
Falk (1988) found, the implementation of well-paying, high-skilled industries was 
centered in and around urban centers. 
In their analysis of rural America, Hamilton et al. (2008) found that respondents 
were often concentrated in low-skill employment and less than half of all surveyed 
reported working full-time. Though their surveyed counties were selected purposively 
and thus not generalizable to all rural America, their findings reflect much of what is 
already known of rural labor markets—chiefly the omnipresence of low-skill, low-wage 
labor. There is much more diversity across various rural regions in terms of educational 
attainment, however. Not surprisingly, given what is known about the state of rural 
education levels, those in chronically poor regions are least likely to report having 
attained a college degree. Although minorities were not well represented within their 
analysis, blacks (who were concentrated in the south and made up roughly ten percent of 
their overall sample), were also less educated than white respondents (ibid; see also 
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Colocousis and Rogers 2010). Likewise, Isserman, Feser, and Warren (2009) found that 
rural areas with fewer minorities tend to be more prosperous than others, indicative of 
uneven economic development's consequences for rural nonwhites. 
With this discussion of the rural US, I do not mean to pain an overly optimistic 
portrait of urban labor markets, however. Whereas rural America has lagged behind the 
urban in terms of economic development, the urban US has experienced a rather 
substantial outflow of its skilled, well-paying jobs in recent decades (Wilson 1996). 
Many were not simply lost to industrial transformation alone. A large portion has been 
relocated to the suburbs, a phenomenon that has also worsened "yo6 spatial mismatch— 
the notion that work and people are located in two different places" (Wilson 2009: 10). 
While this mismatch might not play a particularly critical role, as Pryor and Shaffer 
(1999) assert, it has impacted blacks (especially males) more so than other workers (ibid: 
198-204). 
As part of his effort to ensure the safety of the Cold War era US while expanding 
economic growth and mobility, President Eisenhower signed into law the Federal Aid 
Highway Act of 1956. At the same time, however, this highway system ushered in an 
exodus of businesses and workers from the inner-core of US cities and into the outlying 
suburbs. Although the extent to which this new highway system increased mobility 
across the nation cannot be overstated, it also managed to accelerate white-flight from 
urban areas into the suburbs. 
This suburbanization of employment has been particularly detrimental to those 
lacking the education necessary to continue up the occupational ladder as semi-skilled 
jobs in the middle diminish (Massey and Denton 1993: 184). Given these changes, urban 
25 
labor markets in many ways are now more likely than ever to mirror their rural 
counterparts, one major difference being that urban centers have retained some of their 
skilled labor pools to which rural Americans have long lacked access. Peck (1996) 
describes urban labor markets as "profoundly contradictory places" (p. 140) in which 
secondary sector jobs (those in which job insecurity is a defining factor) are becoming 
increasingly common, and in which competition for economic resources (including 
workers) among firms has tended toward the chaotic (witness, for instance, the financial 
activities that gave rise to the Great Recession). Such changes have resulted in urban 
labor markets becoming increasingly more "crisis-prone" (ibid). 
Current Study & Hypotheses 
These economic distinctions between whites and various nonwhites, as well as 
among rural, urban and suburban labor markets, lead to a number of hypotheses. Given 
the long history of discrimination against minorities in US labor markets, their greater 
likelihood of being represented in menial labor and lower rates of education, and that 
urban and suburban regions tend to have a more educated work force and greater 
economic diversity, I hypothesize that: 
1) Compared to whites, Hispanics and blacks are the less likely to occupy high-
skilled occupations, and are overrepresented in low-skill employment. They are also 
more likely to be found within middle-skill employment, given their recent gains in these 
industries and their underrepresentation among the college educated. Hispanics, given 
their greater high school attrition rates, are also the least likely to hold high-skill 
employment. 
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Furthermore, 2) Given the disproportionate development of nonstandard 
employment in the rural US, rural residents in general are more likely than their urban 
and suburban counterparts to hold low-skill employment—a trend that is likely more 
prominent for nonwhites. Given the out-migration of many well-paying jobs to the 
suburbs, as well as the exodus of the urban middle-class (including some minorities), 
high-skill gains in general are most likely reported among suburban residents, no matter 
their race. 
With respect to labor-market polarization, I anticipate that 3) If such a trend 
occurred, it would have disproportionately affected blacks and Hispanics, who are less 
likely than their white peers to have obtained the formal education required for high-skill 
employment. Thus, if middle-skill jobs are evaporating, a rise in the percent of low-skill 





I draw on CPS data gathered between 1990 and 2009. Approximately 60,000 
respondents are surveyed monthly by the Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). The CPS focuses on issues pertaining to labor force participation, as 
well as education, employment status, and residence. Respondents are classified not only 
by occupation, but also by industry. Scholars often use the CPS to measure overall 
economic wellbeing in the US. The Minnesota Population Center provided the data for 
this analysis (Miriam et al. 2010). I exclude those interviewed prior to 1990 as, according 
to Autor (2010), labor market bifurcation increased dramatically at the beginning of this 
decade. Respondents were interviewed both in person and via phone, and then excluded 
from subsequent surveying. 
Not all CPS respondents between 1990 and 2009 are incorporated in this analysis. 
The original dataset included nearly 2.5 million cases. I exclude those who are 
unemployed, retired, or working in the military. Because I am concerned only with adults 
in the labor force, and because of the likelihood that they are employed in low-skill jobs, 
I excluded those under 18, resulting in a sample size of 1,181,809. Thus, the findings 
reported below are generalizable only to those above age 17. Utilizing SPSS (version 18), 
I use descriptive statistics to provide an overview of the current state of middle-skill jobs 
within the CPS sample. Given this large sample size, I do not employ significance 
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testing, as we can be relatively certain that the patterns within this sample exist in the 
population. Individuals are the unit of analysis. 
Dependent Variable of Interest 
Skill Level. Scholars have measured skill level in various ways. I discuss each of 
these methods in detail below before elaborating on the method I employ in this analysis. 
1) Education as Proxy for Skill 
Some past analyses have relied solely on education as a measure of skill (for 
instance, Blank and Shierholz 2006). Such measures give no attention to the prevalence 
of jobs that require significant on the job training, however, nor do they deal with job-
education mismatches. Holzer and Lerman (2007) also used education (coupled with the 
most common level of training workers within any given occupation possessed) in their 
discussions of various middle-skill jobs. This measure, with eleven ordinal-level 
categories developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008) "describes the education or 
training needed by most workers to become fully qualified in a given occupation" (p. 39). 
However, the BLS also goes on to note that these "categories cannot and do not describe 
all (pathways into an occupation) and are not intended to indicate the level of education 
and training required for a person to be hired" (p. 39). As such, they are not applicable to 
this analysis. 
2) Occupational-Sector Skill Level 
Other researchers add more depth to the analysis of skill by using broad 
occupational groups. I refer to this (following Holzer and Lerman) as "Occupational-
Sector Skill Level." The CPS includes a detailed measure of a respondent's occupation 
(with upwards of 600 codes). These occupational codes are fine-grained and include, for 
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example, cashiers, sociologists, and respiratory therapists. Holzer and Lerman (2007) and 
Autor (2010)—and most who study occupations—collapsed these occupations into 11 
broad occupational categories: professional; technical; managerial; service; agriculture; 
office, administrative and clerical; sales; construction; installation and repair; production; 
transportation and moving. They classify low, middle and high-skill jobs based on these 
occupational groupings: 
Low-Skill: Agriculture; Service 
Middle- Sales; Office, Administrative and 
Skill: Clerical; Installation and Repair; 
Construction; Production; Moving and 
Transportation 
High-Skill: Managerial; Professional; Technical 
To get a sense of these occupations, using occupational-sector skill level codings, 
I present the top three detailed occupations in each of these CPS broad occupational 
groups in 1990, 2000 and 2009, according to the 1990 occupation-coding scheme (see 
Tables la, lb and lc below). The numbers in parentheses represent the percent of 
workers in the corresponding occupation sector employed in each of these occupations. 




Farmers (Owners and Tenants) (36.4%) 
Farm workers (25.6%) 




Cooks, variously defined (13.1%) 
Waiters & Waitresses (9.6%) 
Sales 
(Middle) 
Sales Persons, not elsewhere classified (37.7%) 






Bookkeepers and Accounting and Auditing Clerks (10.7%) 
Administrative Support Jobs, not elsewhere classified (5.2%) 
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Automobile Mechanics (19.3%) 
Mechanics and Repairers, not elsewhere classified (16.0%) 
Industry Machine Repairers (9.4%) 
Carpenters (25.2%) 
Electricians (14.4%) 
Supervisors of Construction Work (12.7%) 
Assemblers of Electrical Equipment (12.2%) 
Production Supervisors or Foremen (11.6%) 
Machine Operators, not elsewhere classified (10.9%) 
Truck, Delivery and Tractor Drivers (35.3%) 
Laborers outside Construction (14.0%) 
Freight, Stock, and Material Handlers (8.1%) 
Managers and administrators, not elsewhere classified (76.6%) 
Managers and specialists in marketing, advertising, and public 
relations (5.7%) 
Managers in education and related fields (5.3%) 
Registered Nurses (8.6%) 
Primary School Teachers (7.4%) 
Accountants and Auditors (7.2%) 
Computer Software Developers (15.0%) 
Licensed Practical Nurses (12.0%) 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering Technicians (9.2%) 






and Clerical (Middle) 
Installation and Repair 
OiTunflHonrPerc-pnfnfSwtft^ 
Farmers (Owners and Tenants) (28.6%) 
Farm Workers (24.0%) 
Gardeners and Groundskeepers (22.5%) 
Cooks, variously defined (13.5%) 
Janitors (13.3%) 
Nursing Aides, Orderlies and Attendants (11.5%) 
Sales Persons, not elsewhere classified (34.4%) 
Supervisors and Proprietors of Sales Jobs (31.9%) 
Cashiers (15.7%) 
Secretaries (14.3%) 
Bookkeepers and Accountant and Auditing Clerks (9.1%) 
Teacher's aides (6.7%) 











Mechanics and Repairers, not elsewhere classified (14.1%) 
Industrial Machinery Repair (11.1%) 
Carpenters (25.1%) 
Supervisors of Construction Work (15.1%) 
Electricians (14.1%) 
Machine Operators, not elsewhere classified (14.8%) 
Assemblers of Electrical Equipment (14.6%) 
Production Supervisors or Foremen (10.3%) 
Truck, Delivery and Tractor Drivers (35.6%) 
Laborers Outside Construction (12.1%) 
Stock Handlers (8.5%) 
Managers and Administrators, not elsewhere classified (56.4%) 
Managers of Food-serving and Lodging Establishments (10.1%) 
Managers and Specialists in Marketing, Advertising and Public 
Relations (6.4%) 
Primary School Teachers (8.4%) 
Registered Nurses (7.8%) 
Computer Systems Analysts and Computer Scientists (6.6%) 
Health Technologists and Technicians, not elsewhere classified 
(17.1%) 
Computer Software Developers (15.4%) 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering Technicians (12.6%) 






and Clerical (Middle) 
«i^M^^i^^i«iif.Mtttg -bm&m* Gardeners and Groundskeepers (28.3%) 
Farmers (Owners and Tenants (23.4%) 
Farm Workers (20.7%) 
Cooks, variously defined (13.4%) 
Nursing Aides, Orderlies and Attendants (13.1%) 
Janitors (9.9%) 
Supervisors and Proprietors of Sales Jobs (30.2%) 
Retail Sales Clerks (19.5%) 
Cashiers (18.2%) 
Secretaries (16.6%) 
Customer Service Reps, Investigators and Adjusters, Except 
Insurance (10.3%) 
Office Supervisors (8.5%) 
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Automobile Mechanics (17.2%) 
Mechanics and Repairers, not elsewhere classified (12.8%) 
Telecom and Line Installers and Repairers (8.6%) 
Carpenters (22.9%) 
Electricians (15.9%) 
Supervisors of Construction Work (13.9%) 
Assemblers of Electrical Equipment (12.6%) 
Machine Operators, not elsewhere classified (9.9%) 
Production Supervisors or Foremen (9.4%) 
Truck, Delivery and Tractor Drivers (37.6%) 
Laborers Outside Construction (16.5%) 
Construction Laborers (14.5%) 
Managers and Administrators, not elsewhere classified (44.9%) 
Chief Executives and Public Administrators (11.8%) 
Financial Managers (8.2%) 
Primary School Teachers (9.8%) 
Registered Nurses (9.1%) 
Teachers, not elsewhere classified (6.4%) 
Computer Software Developers (28.1%) 
Licensed Practical Nurses (11.5%) 
Legal Assistants, Paralegals, Legal Support, etc. (11.1%) 
As Table la indicates, 36.4 percent of all respondents with the broad occupational 
group of "agriculture" work as farmers, 25.6 percent are employed as farm workers, and 
just under a fifth work as gardeners and groundskeepers. With these three detailed 
occupational codes, I capture nearly 81 percent of all those who worked in agriculture in 
1990; this holds true for this sector in 2000 (when these three jobs captured 75 percent of 
all agriculture workers) and 2009 (when 72 percent of agriculture workers were 
employed in one of these three occupations). 
Notice also that the top three occupations in each group tend to reflect the skill-
level of that particular sector, though this is not always the case. Cashiers, for instance— 
an occupation that according to the BLS requires only short-term on-the-job training— 
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are regarded here as middle-skill. Unspecified salespersons—clearly a broad category— 
likely encompasses many low-skill workers as well. Thus, to suggest that all occupations 
within a given occupational group are of the same skill-level fails to capture the 
variability within each of these categories. Occupational sectors are likely far more 
diverse in terms of the skills required of their workers. Another alternative to skill-
coding, developed by the US Department of Labor, likely captures much of this 
variability. 
3) Occupational Information Network (Q*NET) 
ONET—the Occupational Information Network—categorizes occupations into 
five ordinal categories. These categories or "job zones"—derived from a combination of 
the on-the-job training and formal education required of each position—are as follows: 1 
("Little or No Preparation"); 2 ("Some Preparation"); 3 ("Medium Preparation"); 4 
("Considerable Preparation"); 5 ("Extensive Preparation") (0*NET Resource Center 
2010). Jobs designated as requiring little or no preparation require no more than a high 
school diploma—if not less—and no more than a month of training and little to no related 
experience. Those in the second category require a high-school diploma of their workers, 
at least some related experience and several months of training. Medium preparation 
entails some form of official training, such as that undertaken in a vocational/technical 
program or a two-year degree; apprenticeships and/or licensure might also be required. 
Finally, workers whose jobs require considerable preparation must have earned a 
bachelor's degree, while those in occupations requiring extensive preparation typically 
need at least a master's degree. 
34 
The ONET has been utilized in the past to analyze various forms of human capital 
and their distribution across the urban US (Scott 2009). Although this system has not 
been utilized in the past to analyze the prevalence of skilled employment, these zones are 
likely correlated with these skill groupings as follows: Low = 1 ("Little or No 
Preparation"); Middle = 2 ("Some Preparation") and 3 ("Medium Preparation"); and 
High = 4 ("Considerable Preparation") and 5 ("Extensive Preparation"). 
Table 4. Crosstabulation of 0*NET Job Zones by Occupational Sector 
$m 
IJlittleorfloPrep 
2] Some Prep 
1] Medium Prep 
4] Considerable Prep 















































Table 4 illustrates the cross-tabulation of these 0*NET job zones with the 
occupational-skill sectors. As these figures indicate, the two measures are moderately, 
though not perfectly, correlated. Moreover, when these occupational sectors are collapsed 
into their corresponding skill groupings (e.g., managerial, professional and technical into 
high skill, service and agriculture into low skill, etc.) a gamma of .889 indicates that the 
two are highly associated (see Table 5 below). 
0*NET also highlights some of the drawbacks of the occupational-sector 
measure. Notice in Table 5 that only half of those jobs that the occupational-skill sector 
measure considers low-skill require "little or no" preparation according to 0*NET. 
Moreover, just under a quarter of those jobs classified as high-skill actually require 
nothing more than an Associate's degree. By ignoring the variability of skill within 
various occupational sectors, the measure utilized by Holzer and Lerman, as well as 
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Autor, likely understates the prevalence of middle-skill jobs, while overstating the 
frequency of low- and high-skill employment. 
Table 5. Crosstabulation of 0*NET Job Zones by High, Middle and Low-Skill 
Employment Measures 
0*NET 
1 (Little or No Preparation Needed) 
2 (Some Preparation Needed) 
3 (Medium Preparation Needed) 
4 (Considerable Preparation Needed) 




























Thus, each of these two coding methods clearly has its own consequences for 
drawing conclusions about the prevalence of low, middle, and high-skilled employment. 
However, as figures 2a through 2c (author generated) demonstrate, the trends in the 
decline of middle-skill employment and the increasing prevalence of high and low-skill 
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Figure 2b. Percent of Workers in Middle-Skill Jobs, 1990 - 2009 
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Figure 2c. Percent of Workers in High-Skill Jobs, 1990 - 2009 
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ONET appears to understate the prevalence of low-skill employment while at the 
same time suggesting middle- and high-skill jobs are quite robust. Differences between 
the Occupational-Sector method and 0*NET are most pronounced where middle-skill 
jobs are concerned. The Occupational Sector method used by Holzer and Lerman (2007) 
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and Autor (2010) is, however, least susceptible to the changeover in occupational coding 
between 2002 and 2003 l, as the percentage-point changes below suggest (although 
differences between the two are minimal). 
Coding Method Skill 2002 2003 Percentage-Point Difference 
Occupational Low 15.7% 16.9% -1.2 
Sector Middle 49.2% 48.8% 0.3 
High 35.1% 34.2% .9 
0*NET Low 13.1% 15.4% -2.3 
Middle 55.2% 53.2% 2.1 
High 31.7% 31.5% 0.3 
Variation between these methods likely persists for several reasons. First, the 
Occupational-Sector method fails to capture the diversity of skills within a given 
occupation sector (all technical jobs, for instance, are coded as high-skill, though many of 
them require nothing more than an associate's degree). The occupation-sector skill 
categorization is also far less susceptible to credentialism, as occupations do not change 
sectors over time. Finally, 0*NET does not lend itself particularly well to recoding 
IPUMS-CPS occupations to match its job-zones, as the occupations listed by the CPS (of 
which there are, since 2003, 539) do not readily match the titles of those provided by 
0*NET (which lists 855 occupations). 
Given these differences, I argue that the best method is one that utilizes 
occupation sectors (as it most readily lends itself to replication), with one modification. 
Given that, according to 0*NET, all jobs listed as Technical occupations require only 
moderate preparation, most often requiring nothing more than an Associate's degree, I 
code all Technical jobs as middle-skill rather than high-skill. These occupations (of 
1
 In 2003, the CPS stopped using its 1990-coding scheme and began using a similar, but more refined 
classification system. This new system, just like the 1990 system that replaced the one used during the 
1980s, reflects real changes in the division of labor, with some occupations splitting into several, and others 
being eliminated altogether. These coding schemes are similar, though not entirely consistent, with one 
another. 
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which there are 17 under the 1990 scheme), include dental hygienists, licensed practical 
nurses, numerous health technologists, engineering technicians, air traffic controllers, 
legal assistants and paralegals. Although such occupations are generally grouped with 
Professional and Related jobs (under, for instance, "Healthcare Practitioners and 
Technical Occupations"), they require nothing more than certification and/or a two-year 
degree. Thus, I include only managerial and profession occupations as "high-skill." 
Moreover, like Holzer and Lerman (2007), I will analyze various occupations 
themselves throughout my discussions of labor market changes, illustrating the variations 
of skill within the various low, middle, and high-skill categories. It is likely, for instance, 
that nonwhites or rural Americans employed in high-skill occupational sectors might hold 
jobs in such fields that do not actually require at least a four-year degree. Thus, I maintain 
skill as an ordinal-level variable, wherein 1 refers to low-skill, 2 to middle and 3 to high. 
These skill-levels match those utilized by Holzer and Lerman, with the exception of 
Technical occupations, and I complement this analysis by moving down to the 
occupation level. I maintain Sales occupations as middle-skill, given the prevalence of 
occupations in this sector that require medium or considerable preparation (72 percent) 
according to ONET. 
Independent/Explanatory Variables 
Race/Ethnicity. The following racial groups are included: Non-Hispanic white 
(73.7 percent); Non-Hispanic black (10.5 percent); Hispanic (11 percent), and Other Non-
Hispanics (4.9 percent). Although the CPS includes data on Asians, Native Americans, 
and other biracial and multiracial respondents, such groups constitute only about 5 
percent of the total sample, thus I exclude them from my analyses that pertain specifically 
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to race. Thus, although Asians and Other Non-Hispanics are included in total 
distributions across low, middle, and high-skill employment at the start of my analysis, I 
focus on differences between non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and Hispanics 
(referring to the former groups as "whites" and "blacks" from this point forward). 
Because the CPS originally included Hispanic as an item separate from its 
race/ethnicity variable, a recode was necessary in order to incorporate the desired 
categories. Hispanics are those who answered "Yes" to any of the various Hispanic-
ethnic categories, which included Mexican (asked since 2003), Mexican American (asked 
until 2002), Chicano/Chicana (asked until 2002), Mexican/Mexicano (asked until 2002), 
Puerto Rican (1990-2009), Cuban (1990-2009), Other Spanish (1990-2009) and 
Central/South American (1990-2009). No respondents are missing data with respect to 
race, but .9 percent reported "Do Not Know" the original Hispanic variable (I treat these 
as missing data). 
Urban/Rural Residence. The CPS incorporates a variable indicating whether 
residents' status is either urban or nonurban, relying on the US Census definition to 
differentiate between the two. Changes in population have resulted in a number of 
counties being reclassified over the years, namely in 1993 and 2004. The map below 
illustrates some of these changes, the result of rural population growth and the sprawl of 
metropolitan centers. Although nearly 90 percent of all counties retained their rural/urban 
classification, 343 witnessed a status change. Changes within the CPS sample to be 
analyzed are also shown below. 
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Changes in Noninetropolitan and Metropolitan Status, 1993-2003 (x) 
Figure 3. Population Change by Residence, 1990-2009 
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Notice that, with the exception of a population increase between 1995 and 1996, 
the suburban portion of the sample appears to be affected relatively little by these 
definition changes. The rural and urban portions of the sample were also susceptible to 
these changes in the mid 1990s, though both were also influenced by another in 2004-
2005. Although these definition changes and their reflection within the sample represent 
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pertinent demographic trends (the encroachment of urban on the rural as the former 
expands), they also pose critical analytical issues. Some past researchers have chosen to 
analyze data either between these years (i.e., 1996 to 2003) or from 2004 onward, to 
bypass this definitional issue—a strategy that would significantly limit the empirical 
scope of my analysis. Others (Slack 2010, for instance) have chosen to disregard this 
definitional issue in their analyses. Given that these changes and their influences on the 
sample are reflective of true demographic and migratory trends, and that their influence is 
minimal (again, only 10 percent of US counties experienced a change in urban/rural 
status), I utilize the latter approach. 
Originally, the CPS data included the following categories: Not identifiable (.5 
percent); Not in metro area (17.8 percent); Central city (24.5 percent); Outside central 
city (43.1 percent); In metro area, central city status unknown (14.2 percent). The latter 
three represent metropolitan residence. Those "not identifiable" have been categorized as 
such for confidentiality purposes, and here will be regarded as missing data, not included 
in this portion of the analysis. I include those whose central city status is unknown in my 
suburban category. Thus, recoded distributions are as follows: 17.8 percent rural, 57.3 
percent suburban, and 24.5 percent urban. Past studies that have utilized the CPS to 
explore rural/urban differences include Cotter et al. (1996), Gundersen (2006), 
McLaughlin (2002), McLaughlin and Coleman-Jensen (2009), and Parisi et al. (2005). 
Year. Models utilizing CPS data in which year is the independent variable of 
interest will help determine whether the percent employed in middle-skill occupations 
has declined since the early 1990s. Autor (2010) and Holzer and Lerman (2007) both 
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uncovered such a decrease, though Autor's analysis paints a more dramatic picture of 
decline. No respondents are missing data on this variable. 
Industry. Dummy variables comprising the follow industries are: 
Agriculture/Mining (2.9 percent); Construction (6.7 percent); Manufacturing (14.6 
percent); Transportation, Communication & Other Utilities (5.7 percent); Wholesale and 
Retail Trade (19.8 percent); Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (6.8 percent); Business, 
Repair and Personal Services (11 percent); Entertainment and Recreation (2.1 percent); 
Professional and Related Services (25 percent); Public Administration (5.3 percent). No 
respondents are missing data with respect to industry. 
Ase. Younger workers, Hudson found, are more likely to hold positions 
comprised of "bad" job characteristics, but eventually age out of them (2007). 
Additionally, Holzer and Lerman (2007) state that older workers near retirement are more 
likely to hold middle-skill jobs than other areas. Should older workers be significantly 
more prevalent in middle-skill employment than other age groups, such a finding would 
give credence to the assertion that experienced workers will be needed to fill these jobs in 
the coming years, as diversification theories suggest. I incorporate the following age 
groups into an ordinal-level variable to be tested separately: 18-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 

























Sex. Autor (2010) found that males are less likely to be employed in middle-skill 
jobs, having attained less education over the years in comparison to females. Black males 
may be in particular danger of falling into low-skill employment. Moreover, the different 
job queues in which males and females are to be found (Cotter et al. 2005; England 2005; 
Reskin and Roos 1990; Reskin and Hartmann 1986; Roos 1985) likely has a significant 
impact on the type of skilled employment in which these respondents are to be found. 
Thus, dummy variables representing male and female are included; 53.3 percent of the 
CPS sample is male, and 46.7 percent female, and none are missing data. 
Weights 
The CPS data will be weighted using the "person-weight" variable provided by 
IPUMS. This variable extends the sample's generalizability by taking each case within 
the sample and weighting it based on the number of individuals it represents in the US 
population. This weight also corrects for the oversampling of particular subsets of the 
population, including Hispanics. 
Methods 
I begin by providing a descriptive overview of low, middle, and high-skill worker 
characteristics. Notice that this discussion pertains only to CPS respondents between 
1990 and 2006. I then provide an in-depth discussion of changes in skilled employment 
during the current economic decline (2007 to 2009) in order to control for the effects of 
the Great Recession on labor market bifurcation (which, as discussed below, has actually 
sped up dramatically since 2007). I pay particular attention to non-Hispanic blacks and 
rural residents in general. 
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To explicate these changes further, I also illustrate the occupational-sectors in 
which changes occurred, where and for whom. Given the sample size, I do not include 
the results of statistical significance tests, although chi-qquare analyses suggest that all 




The Changing Racial Composition of American Labor: 1990 to 2006 
The 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century saw significant changes 
in low, middle, and high-skill employment, as Figure 4 illustrates. In 2006, 52 percent of 
all workers held jobs in middle-skill sectors, down from 58 percent in 1990. At the same 
time, the percent employed in high- and low-skill sectors increased steadily, though at a 
more rapid pace for high-skill occupations. Still, by 2006, more than half of the US labor 
force continued to be employed in middle-skill occupations, despite the labor market's 
six-percentage point decline in middle-skill employment. 
Figure 4. Percent Change in Low, Middle, and High-Skill 
Employment, 1990 - 2006 
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Figure 5 presents the total number of workers in each of these skill sectors 
between 1990 and 2006. Bear in mind that the total workforce under consideration here 
also increased during this time by roughly 25 million. Thus, the overall increase in each 
of these skill sectors demonstrated in Figure 5 masks the changing makeup of US labor. 
For instance, while the total number employed in middle-skill jobs increased by 9 percent 
between 1990 and 2006, its share of total employment simultaneously fell by about 6 
percentage points during this same period. The middle-skill workforce, though growing 
in sheer numbers, was unable to keep pace with the 37 percent increase in low-skill 
employment (a difference of about 6.6 million jobs between these two years) and the 41.7 
percent increase witnessed by high-skill work (which increased by some 12.7 million 
workers since 1990). 
Figure 5. Total Employment in Low, Middle and High-Skill Work, 
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As anticipated, these changes vary widely depending on race, as well as rural, 
suburban and urban residence. Figures 6 through 9 below illustrate the changing racial 
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composition of the low, middle, and high-skill workforce in the US. The overall trends 
are the same for all racial groups: a decline in the percentage of middle-skill occupations 
while shares of low and high-skill employment grew. The severity of such fluctuations, 
however, varies from one group to the next. Blacks workers saw the most dramatic drop 
in their share of middle-skill jobs (a decrease of nearly 9 percentage points), followed by 
whites (a 6.5 percentage-point decline). This trend was least pronounced for Hispanics, 
whose share of middle-skill jobs witnessed a 3 percentage-point drop. By 2006, 
Hispanics continued to hold the largest share of middle-skill jobs, at 59 percent, 
compared to white and black workers' similar 51 percent. 
At the same time, whites' share of low-skill sector jobs remained relatively 
unchanged, increasing only 1 percentage point by the end of this sixteen-year period, 
hovering around 14 percent—the lowest of any racial demographic group. Blacks' share 
of low-skill work, though increasing only by 1 percent by the end of this period, 
underwent some significant changes between these years, rising steadily throughout the 
early and mid 1990s before reaching a low of about 20 percent in 1998. Blacks' rising 
share of high-skill employment, which grew during this same period, helps partly to 
explain this trend. By 2006, however, just under a quarter of black workers could hold 
low-skill labor—a share similar, though slightly lower, than Hispanics' 26.4 percent. Just 
as in 1990, blacks and Hispanics were more likely to hold low-skill jobs than whites. 
Notice that this growth of low-skill labor has been relatively evenly distributed during the 
1990s and early 2000s, with all racial groups experiencing only slight increases in their 
shares of low-skill employment. Gains in high-skill employment, however, are quite 
disparate. 
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Figure 6a. White Workers' Changing Share of Low, Middle, and 
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Figure 6b. Black Workers' Changing Share of Low, Middle, and 







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
-•-Low -»-Middle -*-High 
49 
Figure 6c. Hispanic Workers' Changing Share of Low, Middle, and 
High-Skill Labor, 1990-2006 
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Blacks, though they continue to be overrepresented in low-skill employment, 
made substantial gains in their overall share of high-skill employment—a trend in 
keeping with their growing rate of access to higher education (see US Census 2000a, 
2000b for further discussion). Blacks' movement into jobs requiring at least a four-year 
college degree outpaced that of any other racial demographic—a nearly 8 percentage-
point increase during this sixteen-year period (see Figure 7 below). Whites, too, made 
significant gains in high-skill employment (a 5.4 percentage-point change). Hispanics, on 
the other hand, remained quite underrepresented in high-skill employment, experiencing 
the slowest rate of growth in this sector of skilled employment (a change of only 1.4 
percentage points). 
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Figure 7. Percentage Point Changes in Low, Middle, and High-Skill 
Employment by Race, 1990 to 2006 
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To summarize, all witnessed a drop in middle-skill work (steepest for whites and 
least dramatic for Hispanics), while low-skill work increased by only about one-
percentage point. All saw a rise in high-skill employment, most notably for blacks and 
least apparent among Hispanics. In spite of such changes, just as hypothesized, blacks 
and Hispanics are overrepresented in low-skill jobs, and are much less likely to hold 
high-skill positions compared to their white counterparts. While Hispanics are 
overrepresented in middle-skill jobs, blacks are no more likely to hold such jobs than 
whites. Finally, as hypothesized, Hispanics are least likely to hold high-skill jobs, and 
blacks also remain less likely than whites to hold these positions. 
The Persisting Race/Gender Gap in Low, Middle, and High-Skill Labor 
Given the vast differences in their job queues (i.e., the types of jobs and industries 
in which men and women are to be found) however, men and women did not experience 
the above changes similarly. Table 7 displays men and women's shares of low, middle 
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and high-skill employment by race in 1990 and 2006, as well as the percentage-point 
changes witnessed by men and women of various racial groups. These figures add yet 
another layer to those displayed in Table 6. Whereas trends in the decline of middle-skill 
work and the growing share of low and high-skill employment appear universal across all 
race groups, as illustrated in Figure 7, an examination of gender differences demonstrates 
that men and women did not always experience trends of similar strength or 
directionality. 
The bulk of middle-skill labor's shrinking share of employment, though largely 
experienced by both men and women, was clearly more widespread among women 
workers, who also remain much less likely to hold middle-skill work and more likely to 
hold low and high-skill work. Thus, not only did women of nearly all racial groups tend 
to be less likely to hold middle-skill jobs two decades ago, they also moved out of such 
jobs at far greater rates than men while simultaneously increasing their shares of high-
skill work at greater rates. 
White women, for instance, experienced a nearly ten-percentage point drop in 
their share of middle-skill jobs—more than six-percentage points greater than that 
experienced by men. Interestingly, middle-skill black workers of both genders witnessed 
a similar decline in their shares of middle-skill jobs, though black males (like those of 
other races) remain more likely than their female counterparts to hold these occupations. 
Hispanic men and women in 2006 experienced the greatest gender differences in middle-
skill work: a difference of over 17 percentage points. By 2006, middle-skill work had 
become the skill-sector where gender differences were most pronounced—a rift that 
existed in, but has expanded since, 1990. 
Figure 8a. Gender Differences in Low-Skill Employment by Race, 
1990 & 2006 
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Figure 8b. Gender Differences in Middle-Skill Employment by 
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Figure 8c. Gender Differences in High-Skill Employment by Race, 
1990 & 2006 
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Black male workers also stand out from other racial groups in terms of their 
higher influx into low-skill labor compared to their female peers (a slight, but significant, 
difference). As Figure 8a shows, women—especially women of color—are far more 
likely to hold low-skill jobs. Gender differences for low-skill employment are also most 
pronounced among Hispanics, with males holding low-skill jobs at a rate of eleven 
percentage-points behind females, and nine percentage-points behind their female 
counterparts in terms of their rate of high-skill employment. 
Surprisingly, women of all racial groups are more likely than their racially 
matched male counterparts to hold high-skill jobs (see Figure 8c), likely owing to their 
greater rates of obtaining college degrees. In 1990, this was only the case for blacks and 
Hispanics, though by 2006 this became the norm for all racial groups, being most 
pronounced between Hispanics. In summary, high-skill work grew much more for 
females than males (perhaps helping to explain why middle-skill declined more so for 
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females than males). Hispanics experienced similar trends as whites, though a different 
pattern arose for blacks (with high-skill growth expanding at equal rates, though again 
females remain more likely to hold these jobs). 
Spatial Differences in Access to Low, Middle, and High-Skill Employment 
Differences also persist across rural, suburban, and urban labor markets, where 
changes in low, middle, and high-skill employment have taken place at varying rates 
since 1990 (see Figures 9a through 9c). Following the overall trend, middle-skill jobs 
declined in all three of these areas, while the shares of low and high-skill jobs increased 
(with the exception of low-skill jobs in Rural America). Although past research has 
shown rural America to be more susceptible to negative economic patterns, it retained a 
greater share of its middle-skill jobs. Suburban and urban America, in fact, actually 
witnessed greater declines in middle-skill work. In 2006, rural workers continued to 
experience the highest rate of middle-skill work (56 percent), followed by suburban 
workers (52 percent) and those in urban areas (half of whom reported working in middle-
skill occupations). While the percent of high-skill employment is lower in rural America 
(just under a quarter, compared to one-third of suburban and urban workers), it increased 
at a rate similar to that in suburban and urban areas. Thus, by 2006, all workers, 
regardless of their place of residence, became more likely to hold low and high-skill jobs, 
with the exception of rural workers, who were no more likely hold low-skill employment 
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Figure 9c. Percent Changes in Low, Middle, and High-Skill Urban 
Employment, 1990-2006 
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These distributions with respect to gender are displayed below in Figure 9d. With 
the minor exception of rural women's slight decline in low-skill employment, these 
changes align with the rural, suburban and urban trends detailed above. Rural men did not 
experience gains or losses in either low or high-skill labor; thus, what gains rural 
America did make in high-skill employment can be attributed to women. This is also true 
of high-skill work in suburban and urban areas, though slightly less pronounced. Urban 
men, moreover, while less likely to hold low-skill work, experienced a growth rate in 
these occupations slightly higher than that of women (four percentage points compared to 
two). Declines in women's middle-skill employment, though quite similar across all three 
areas, were most common in urban areas, where men were also most likely to experience 
this decrease. 
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Figure 9d. Percentage Point Change in Low, Middle, and 
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Racial differences persist across these labor markets as well. Figures 10a, 10b, 
and 10c illustrate the variance in skill composition by race across the rural, suburban and 
urban US. Notice, for instance, that 56 percent of rural whites in 2006 could hold middle-
skilled occupations, compared to 51 percent of suburban whites and only 46 percent of 
those in city centers. In addition, whereas roughly 51 percent of suburban and urban 
blacks held middle-skilled jobs in 2006, 57 percent of those in rural labor markets did so. 
Differences among Hispanics are minimal, though they follow a trend similar to that of 
blacks, being most likely to hold middle-skill jobs in rural America and least likely to do 
so in the suburbs. 
As expected, blacks and Hispanics are overrepresented in low-skilled employment 
compared to whites. Nearly a quarter of both blacks and Hispanics report employment in 
these relatively unskilled occupations, although this trend differs substantially by 
residence. Whereas rural residents of all racial groups are the most likely to hold low-
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skill jobs (those that require no more than a high-school education), this trend is much 
more prominent for blacks and Hispanics, just under thirty percent of whom were to hold 
these low-skill positions in 2006. 
Interestingly, as it regards high-skill employment, whites in urban areas are most 
likely to report holding such employment, a trend that differs vastly for nonwhites, who 
are most likely to hold these jobs in the suburbs—a trend that partly speaks to the plight 
of inner-city America and the outmigration of many minorities from urban areas into 
their outlying suburbs (see, for instance, Wilson 1996). In urban areas, nearly 42 percent 
of whites report holding high-skill jobs, compared to only 22 percent of blacks and 13 
percent of Hispanics. Differences with respect to high-skill employment are slightly less 
drastic in the suburbs, where just over a third of whites report employment in these 
occupations, as do 27 percent of blacks and 16 percent of Hispanics. Both whites and 
nonwhites, though, are least likely to hold high-skill jobs in rural regions—representative 
of the underdevelopment in rural America. Across rural, urban and suburban labor 
markets, Hispanics are also far less likely to hold jobs requiring at least a four-year 
degree compared to workers of other racial groups, a pattern that holds true—but is less 
pronounced—for blacks, who made significant gains in high-skill employment since the 
1990s. 
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Figure 10a. Percent of Rural Workers in Low, Middle, and High-
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Figure 10c. Percent of Urban Workers in Low, Middle, and High-
Skill Employment by Race, 2006 
Percentage-point changes (1990 through 2006) for men and women by race and 
residence are displayed in Table 9, while their overall shares are detailed in Table 10. 
Total employment and percent changes by race, residence and gender between 1990 and 
2006 are also presented in Table 11, although these percent changes should be interpreted 
with caution, given that they do not control for population increase (hence, more attention 
should be paid to percentage-point changes). Of men residing in rural areas, only black 
workers experienced a decline in middle-skill work, with changes between black men and 
women in rural America being much less disparate compared to other rural middle-skill 
workers. Moreover, in comparison to women, rural black men actually witnessed a 
decline in their overall share of low-skill jobs (a drop of 1.3 percentage points) while 
black women's share of such work increased by more than 3 percentage points. Low-skill 
Hispanic workers underwent a similar trend, whereas both white men and women 
experienced a drop in their shares of low-skill labor. 
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Declines in middle-skill work between 1990 and 2006 were most dramatic for 
whites in urban areas, where the percentage of white women in these jobs fell by more 
than 11 percentage points. Blacks and Hispanics, on the other hand, experienced this 
decline more sharply in the suburbs. Black suburban men and women alike witnessed a 
decline in middle-skill work of about 9 percentage points, similar to (but slightly higher 
than) the decreases experienced by those in urban areas. Hispanic suburban women also 
experienced a nine percentage-point decline, while Hispanic men saw an increase in 
middle-skill work of about 2 percentage points. It was only in urban areas that Hispanic 
men actually felt a drop in their rate of middle-skill work, though this decline was less 
than one percentage point. 
The starkest gender differences with respect to changes in middle-skill labor in 
2006 were between Hispanic men and women. Rural Hispanic women experienced a gain 
in middle-skill work nearly ten percentage points higher than their male peers. In the 
suburbs, Hispanic men actually experienced an increase in the percent employed in 
middle-skill jobs, whereas Hispanic women saw a drop of over nine percentage points. 
Both Hispanic men and women in urban centers witnessed a drop in middle-skill work, 
like those of other racial groups, though the difference between the two was nearly eight 
percentage points apart. 
Racial disparities appear least pronounced with respect to access to middle-skill 
labor. The consequences for racial equality of such jobs leaving US labor markets remain 
unclear. Upward trends in high-skill employment, particularly among black workers, are 
encouraging. Blacks and Hispanics do, however, continue to lag greatly behind their 
white counterparts with respect to high-skill employment, especially in urban labor 
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markets, where differences between these groups are most glaring. Employment 
differences have declined between whites and blacks, though they have remained largely 
unchanged between whites and Hispanics. For instance, in 1990, white males in rural 
America were 3.4 times more likely to hold high-skill jobs than rural black males (see 
Table 10). By 2006, that rate had narrowed to 2.2. For rural females, on the other hand, 
these rates actually increased, from 1.4 in 1990 to 1.7, though these rates are also quite 
lower for females across all areas, suggesting that racial differences with respect to high-
skill employment are less pronounced between women than they are for men. 
White males in suburban regions were twice as likely as their black male peers to 
hold high-skill employment in 1990—a rate that dropped to 1.4 by 2006. For males, the 
greatest disparities exist between high-skill whites and Hispanics in urban areas—the 
latter of whom are nearly 4 times less likely to hold such jobs. Urban women also 
experience the greatest disparities with respect to high-skill work, in which white women 
are employed at a rate 2.4 times that of Hispanic women and 1.8 times that of black 
women. It seems that, although black workers have made great inroads in terms of access 
to high-skill employment, they continue to lag behind whites in this regard—a disparity 
greater for men, while Hispanic males continue to witness the lowest rates of high-skill 
labor. 
The Changing Influence of Age 
Age, like race, residence and year of employment, also plays a crucial role in 
access to skilled employment, as Hudson (2007) found and as Table 12 (see appendix) 
illustrates. Examining rates of low-skill work, especially by age, can tell us a great deal 
regarding patterns of discrimination in the workplace, the lingering effects of racial 
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prejudice and the extent to which such discrimination has lessened over the years. Data 
regarding 18 to 24 year-olds should be regarded with caution, as this group includes both 
those working through college as well as full-time low-skill laborers. For the same 
reason, those 65+ are excluded from these graphs, given their likelihood of entering 
retirement. 
Observe that white workers in 1990 possessed a curvilinear relationship between 
age and low-skill employment—a relationship that became even more pronounced by 
2006. This relationship between age and low-skill labor is more linear (and negatively 
correlated) for black and Hispanic workers in 1990, though by 2006 it had begun to take 
on the curvilinear relationship similar to that of low-skill whites (see Figures 11a and 
lib). In 1990, blacks fifty years-of-age and older tended to experience rates of low-skill 
work more than double that of whites in this age group—a phenomenon likely related to 
the latter having entered into US labor markets prior to the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, when workforce discrimination and education segregation were quite 
common. Blacks 60 to 64, for example, could hold low-skilled labor at a rate 2.4 times 
that of whites in this age group (38.7 percent compared to 16.3 percent), while those 50 
to 59 experienced a rate of low-skill work 2.8 times higher than their white counterparts. 
By 2006, these rates had dropped slightly, to 2.2 (for those in their early sixties) and 2.1 
(for those in their fifties). Though rates of low-skill work for blacks of all ages remain 
quite higher than white rates, it is encouraging that at the same time these rates are 
narrowing, however slowly. 
Workers also tend to age out of low-skill jobs, as Hudson (2000) suggests and as 
the percentage drops for those between 18 and 49 illustrates. These drops, quite visible 
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for whites in both 1990 and 2006, were virtually nonexistent for blacks and Hispanics in 
the 1990s. By 2006 however, they began to experience this aging-out phenomenon at 
rates more on par with white workers. Such rates likely reflect the declining rate at which 
workers garner greater education after age 25. 
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Changes with respect to age have taken place in the context of middle and high-
skill work as well (see Figures l ie through 1 If, as well as Table 12). Race appears to 
have moderated the relationship between age and type of skilled employment in the 
1990s, though this effect had lessened somewhat by 2006. For instance, black workers 
experienced a decline in their percentage of middle-skill work in 1990 as age increased— 
a relationship far less pronounced for whites and Hispanics. Moreover, as age increases, 
differences between these racial groups and their access to middle-skill work in 1990 also 
expands (see age groups 50 to 59 and 60 to 64 in Figure lie). In 2006, however, 
differences between blacks and whites with respect to age persisted only for those 60 to 
64—a difference of five percentage points, compared to the ten percentage-point 
difference experienced by blacks and whites of this age group in 1990. Hispanics' 
growing shares of these jobs are also apparent. 
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Figure l l f . Percent Employed in High-Skill Work by Age, 2006 
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With respect to high-skill work, blacks between the ages of 30 and 39 experienced 
the greatest change (those 65 and older aside): an increase of more than nine percentage 
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points. Such a trend might be expected, given the rise in access to higher education in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s (see Wilson 1978). Whites in their thirties, on the other hand, 
experienced an increase of about 6 percentage points, with those 50 to 59 reporting the 
greatest access to high-skill work among whites. The greatest gains in high-skill work 
among Hispanics also took place among those in their fifties, though a change of only 
three percentage points compared to those in their forties. Moreover, Hispanics ages 60 to 
64 saw a drop in their rates of high-skill employment of about six percentage points 
between 1990 and 2006, while whites and blacks saw increases of nearly eight percentage 
points. 
These age-group changes with respect to race, residence and year (1990, 2006) 
are displayed in Table 12. Many of the most dramatic changes have taken place in rural 
America, particularly among those 65 and older, though again—with their likelihood of 
retiring—caution should be exercised when making inferences about this age group. It is 
important to note, however, that rates of low-skill employment among whites, blacks and 
Hispanics 65 and older have become far more evenly distributed in rural America since 
1990. Growing equality with respect to these rates is especially pertinent today, in an era 
where workers remain in the workforce for longer periods while foregoing retirement 
(see Shattuck 2010). The most dramatic decline for those 65+ took place among black 
workers, whose rate of low-skill labor in rural regions fell from 80 percent in 1990 to just 
under 41 percent in 2006. In other words, black workers 65 and older were only half as 
likely to hold low-skill work throughout rural America by 2006. 
Hispanics, too, witnessed a similar, albeit less drastic drop, from 63.4 percent in 
1990 to just over 46 percent in 2006—making rural Hispanics 65 and older 37 percent 
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less likely to hold low-skill work by the end of this sixteen-year period. Whites 65 and 
older experienced a drop of only seven percentage points, though they remain 
significantly less likely than both black and Hispanic workers to hold such employment. 
The Role of Industry in Labor Trends 
It is also in rural America where those 65 and older are most likely to hold low-
skill employment, no matter their race. This trend, along with the stagnating rate of rural 
America's low-skill labor force (see Figure 9a), likely has strong ties to changes in the 
industry. Figures 12a and 12b (along with Table 14) display the percent changes in low, 
middle, and high-skill labor by industry in 1990 and 2006. These figures reflect the 
changing nature of work in the US—a nature that differs across residential and racial 
demographics. Overall, agriculture work has changed little, with its percentage of low-
skill work dropping only slightly by two percentage points and its middle-skill jobs 
(which made up only 13 percent of those employed in this industry by 2006) rising by 
almost three percentage points. 
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Figure 12a. Low, Middle, and High-Skill Employment as Shares of 
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Figure 12b. Low, Middle, and High-Skill Employment as Shares of 
Various Industries, 2006 
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In 1990, agriculture jobs accounted for just over 14 percent of low-skill work 
(Figure 12a). In 2006, its share had declined to about 11 percent. Not surprisingly, of all 
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industries with large shares of middle-skill work, manufacturing witnessed the most 
dramatic decrease. In 1990, manufacturing made up nearly a quarter of all middle-skill 
jobs, though by 2006 that figure plummeted to 17 percent. Such a decline represents a 
loss of 17.3 percent, or nearly 3.6 million workers. Wholesale and Retail middle-skill 
work, however, changed little between these years, continuing to account for another 
quarter of middle-skill jobs in 2006—the greatest share of any industry. Construction and 
Professional and Related jobs also significantly increased their shares of middle-skill 
labor, accounting for another 13 percent and 14 percent of middle-skill jobs, respectively, 
in 2006. 
Although the Professional and Related Services industry comprises much of 
America's middle-skill jobs (nearly 15 percent), it also accounts for the largest share of 
low-skill work, with 29 percent of such jobs found in this industry, and another quarter of 
them in Wholesale and Retail Trade. At the same time, the Professional and Related 
Services industry, which includes such jobs as Registered Nurses and Primary School 
Teachers, comprised nearly half of all high-skill work in 2006, followed most closely (by 
a wide margin) by manufacturing, which accounted for another 10 percent of high-skill 
labor, down from nearly 14 percent in 1990. 
A more detailed examination of where rural, suburban and urban residents tended 
to hold various forms of skilled work in 1990 compared to 2006 can tell us a great deal 
not only of the changing racial compositions of these industries, but also the extent to 
which the labor market experiences of whites and nonwhites continue to differ. Tables 
16, 17 and 18 in the appendix display the industry-composition of low, middle and high-
skill employment by race across rural, suburban and urban regions. Nearly a third of low-
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skill whites in rural America occupied jobs in the agriculture industry, as did 41 percent 
of low-skill Hispanics, making agriculture the most dominant low-skill industry for 
nonwhites in rural America. Rural blacks in low-skill work, however, were much less 
likely to hold agriculture (14 percent), instead holding high shares of low-skill 
Professional and Related Service jobs (including housekeepers; guards, watchmen and 
doorkeepers; cooks; and miscellaneous food prep workers) at a rate of 36 percent. 
Low-skill workers in suburban and urban labor markets, not surprisingly, were 
much less likely to hold agriculture, with the exception of Hispanics (17.4 percent of 
whom held such jobs in suburban America in 2006, a six-percentage point drop from 
1990). Instead, low-skill work in these areas tended to be relegated to Wholesale and 
Retail Trade, Professional and Related Services, and Personal Services, though here again 
employment in these industries varied significantly by race. By 2006, for instance, more 
than half of all suburban whites in low-skill occupations could hold either the Wholesale 
and Retail Trade industry (24.7 percent in the suburbs, and nearly 33 percent in urban 
areas) or Professional and Related Services (28.6 percent of suburban whites and a 
quarter of those in urban regions). The most dramatic changes for these low-skill white 
workers took place for those in urban areas, whose percentage of low-skill work in 
Wholesale and Retail trade jumped from nearly 26 percent in 1990 to a third in 2006. 
Hispanics saw this industry's share of low-skill work in urban regions drop, on 
the other hand, from 29.3 percent to 25.5 percent. They also witnessed a rapid decline in 
low-skill Personal Service work, from 24.8 percent to 13.6 percent. Like whites, black 
workers in urban labor markets also witnessed a jump in low-skill Wholesale and Retail 
Trade work, which comprised 12 percent of their low-skill work in 1990 compared to 
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17.5 percent in 2006. Black workers were much more likely to hold jobs in the 
Professional and Related Service industry comprised 41 percent of low-skill work for 
suburban blacks and nearly 46 percent of this work for those in urban areas. 
Like low-skill workers, middle and high-skill work underwent significant changes 
in industry-composition as well. In rural America, for whites, blacks and Hispanics alike, 
Manufacturing and Wholesale & Retail Trade represented the most common industries 
for middle-skill work in rural labor markets—a trend that continued, though at a 
declining rate, from 1990 to 2006. In 1990, nearly 30 percent of middle-skill whites could 
hold manufacturing, compared to over half of middle-skill black workers and just over 36 
percent of Hispanics. These figures demonstrate the propensity of rural workers to hold 
tenuous industries. According to CPS data, manufacturing employment dropped by more 
than 17 percent, from 20.7 million workers to about 17 million between 1990 and 2006. 
By the end of this sixteen-year period, shares of middle-skill work in manufacturing had 
dropped six percentage points for rural whites and nearly 15 points for blacks. Middle-
skill Hispanic workers, however, witnessed little change in their manufacturing 
employment and a decline in middle-skill wholesale/Retail work (from 21 percent to just 
under 18 percent). At the same time, the percent of middle-skill blacks found in 
wholesale/Retail trade climbed nearly 9 percentage points, from 11.7 percent in 1990 to 
just under 20 percent in 2006. 
This decline was not felt by all manufacturing workers, however, given its uneven 
distribution across rural, suburban and urban labor markets, as Table 18 (appendix) 
demonstrates. Because total manufacturing employment has declined, despite the overall 
population increase, an examination of the total employed in various skill sectors of 
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manufacturing can tell us a great deal about how the nature of work—middle-skill work 
in particular—has changed. Among all middle-skill manufacturing workers, rural blacks 
witnessed the most dramatic drop—a decline of 75 percent. Middle-skill manufacturing 
among rural whites was also hard hit, with a fifty percent drop, while rural Hispanics 
simultaneously made significant inroads into middle-skill manufacturing—an increase of 
44 percent (owing partly to both their population increase and in-migration to the US). 
The total of suburban and urban whites in middle-skill manufacturing also 
dropped significantly, by 41 percent and 66 percent, respectively. Like their urban white 
counterparts, urban blacks experience a decline, though nearly thirty percentage points 
less. Hispanics, meanwhile, found greater access to middle-skill manufacturing in 
suburban and urban US. It was only in the suburbs that black workers witnessed any 
increase in their middle-skill manufacturing employment, though this change is marginal. 
White middle-skill work, on the other hand, fell across the board. These figures paint a 
more detailed picture of changing middle-skill labor, with whites seeing larger drops in 
their share of such jobs than blacks, and Hispanics' representation in middle-skill work 
remaining quite high (though decreasing nonetheless). 
By far the greatest drop in manufacturing took place among urban blacks, whose 
representation in low-skill manufacturing fell by more than 260 percent. In 1990, urban 
blacks in low-skill manufacturing tended to occupy positions such as janitors (53 
percent), elevator operators (13 percent, by 2006 down to less than one-tenth of a 
percent) and cooks (from 13.7 percent to 18 percent). By 2006, only a fifth found work as 
janitors, with a quarter also working as Graders and Sorters of Agricultural Products, and 
another fifth as Housing/Lodging Cleaners. Their decline in low-skill work in the 
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manufacturing industry is particularly dramatic when compared to a 39 percent drop for 
urban whites and an increase of two-thirds among Hispanics. Hispanics also witnessed 
increased in urban areas (94 percent) and in the suburbs (a 43 percent increase). Black 
workers have also filled many more of these low-skill jobs outside of urban areas, with 
their low-skill suburban manufacturing employment rising by well over fifty percent and 
by 43 percent in rural America. Like their middle-skill counterparts, low-skill whites saw 
drops in their total manufacturing employment no matter their residence. 
Although their levels of manufacturing employment have changed quite 
dramatically, rural whites and nonwhites tend to hold quite similar jobs, whether in 1990 
or 2006. For instance, whites in rural manufacturing in 1990 were most often found to be 
Production Supervisors or Foremen (7.2 percent), Assemblers of Electrical Equipment 
(7.3 percent) and Machine Operators, not elsewhere classified (6.1 percent). By 2006, 
their top three middle-skill occupations in this industry remained the same, though their 
shares of middle-skill work changed slightly: Assemblers of Electrical Equipment (8.4 
percent); Production Supervisors or Foremen (6 percent); and Machine Operators, not 
elsewhere classified (5.6 percent). Middle-skill rural blacks held slightly different shares 
of these jobs, with their top three manufacturing occupations shifting from Assemblers of 
Electrical Equipment (12.3 percent), Machine Operators not elsewhere classified (10.2 
percent) and Truck, Delivery and Tractor Drivers (5.5 percent) in 1990 to Machine 
Operators not elsewhere classified (11.4 percent), Assemblers of Electrical Equipment 
(13.3 percent) and Truck, Delivery and Tractor Drivers (7.7 percent). Rural Hispanics 
were also to hold these jobs in both 1990 and 2006, holding shares more similar to black 
workers. 
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Manufacturing's high-skill jobs—including Managers and Administrators, 
variously defined Engineers (e.g., Electrical, Chemical, Civil), and Purchasing Managers 
and Buyers—have fared quite well, particularly in the suburbs. Although high-skill white 
workers in this industry witnessed quite similar declines throughout rural, suburban and 
urban regions, blacks and Hispanics tended to experience increases in high-skill 
manufacturing work, particularly in the suburbs, where such employment rose by 44 
percent for blacks and a third for Hispanics. It was only in urban labor markets that 
blacks witnessed a decline in high-skill manufacturing, though only of 4 percent, while 
Hispanics increased their employment in these high-skill jobs by a third. 
These changes in manufacturing, clearly a largely middle-skill industry, 
demonstrate precisely how middle-skill labor in the US has fared since the 1990s. That is, 
although employment in middle-skill manufacturing has declined, from 16 million in 
1990 to 12 million in 2006, total employment in low and high-skill work has actually 
increased, adding 16,000 low-skill jobs and nearly 95,000 high-skill jobs. Clearly, 
however, these additions in manufacturing do not come close to outweighing its drop in 
middle-skill work. While it is clear that middle-skill work throughout the US has 
significantly declined, this change varies greatly by race, residence and gender, though 
also by industry. The Great Recession, however—which some consider to be partly an 
expediting of labor market restructuring—might have had even more drastic 
consequences for middle-skill labor not only in manufacturing, but across the board. 
The Implications of the Great Recession 
If US labor markets are becoming polarized, it stands to reason that such a 
phenomenon will be most deleterious for those in middle-skill employment who lack the 
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training for high-skilled jobs. This is especially true of those in rural regions, who tend to 
be more heavily concentrated in middle-skill occupations. Given that those in rural areas 
are less likely to pursue four-year degrees (Carr and Kefalas 2009), and that blacks and 
Hispanics often pursue four-year degrees at lower rates and at times less successfully 
than whites (Massey et al. 2010), these populations may be more susceptible to economic 
downturns, such as the current recession. 
I also examined how nonwhites and those in rural areas fared during the recession 
with respect to skilled employment in order to shed further light on the extent of their 
susceptibility to economic transformations. Figure 13 illustrates the deleterious influence 
of the recession on middle-skill employment, while changes in total employment appear 
in Table 20. Notice the decline of middle-skill work as a share of overall employment, a 
difference of 3 percentage points in only a three-year period. Such a decrease is not 
typical under times of relative economic stability—the decline between 2003 and 2006, 
for instance, was less than 1 percentage point. Surprisingly, the decline in middle-skill 
work accounts for virtually all of the total change in employment between 2006 and 
2009. This is a difference of 1.9 percent, or more than 2.6 million workers (though some 
industries likely lost more than others, even in low and high-skill employment, a factor 
that I touch on shortly). 
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Figure 13. Percent Changes in Total Low, Middle, and High-Skill 
Employment by Race, 2006-2009 
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As Figure 13 illustrates, percentage drops in total employment were most widely 
felt among whites, whose total employment has dropped 3 percent since 2006. We can 
compare this to a 1.3 percent drop for blacks and an increase of nearly 1.4 percent for 
Hispanic workers (a factor likely tied to their natural population increase, as noted by 
Johnson and Lichter 2008). Overall, whites have also endured the greatest losses in 
middle-skill employment. They experienced a nine percent drop during this three-year 
period. Blacks and Hispanics also experienced declines in middle-skill work, of 6 percent 
and 5 percent, respectively. 
In the midst of this middle-skill decline, increases in total low- and high-skill 
work were also experienced differently across these racial groups. Hispanics experienced 
the starkest increase, as their employment in high-skill labor increased by nearly 18 
percent. This percentage should not mask the total number of jobs gained by this subset 
of the population, though, as this 18-percent increase translates into 485,000 high-skill 
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jobs for Hispanics, compared to 1.4 million for whites and just under 175,000 for blacks. 
At the same time, Hispanics' percent gains in low-skill employment surpassed that of 
both whites (2.63 percent) and blacks (2.14 percent). It is somewhat surprising that, 
although black workers are overrepresented in low-skill work, their percent gains in this 
skill-sector were largely on par with whites. Blacks and whites also made quite similar 
percentage gains in high-skill occupations. 
These changes are quite divergent across rural, suburban and urban labor markets, 
as Table 21 and Figure 14 illustrate. In rural America, black workers experienced the 
greatest decline across all forms of employment, middle-skill and otherwise, with a total 
employment drop of nearly 12 percent (or more than 172,000 jobs). Although the decline 
in middle-skill work across the US was greatest for whites, rural black workers' declining 
rate of middle-skill work was far greater than rural whites, with black workers 
experiencing a drop of nearly 17 percent (or 135,000 jobs) compared to that of ten 
percent for whites (amounting to nearly 972,000 jobs) and only 1.6 percent (or 10,500 
jobs) for rural Hispanics. Again, although the total number of jobs lost was greatest for 
whites, the significantly higher percentage of these jobs lost by rural blacks suggests that 
the loss of middle-skill jobs in rural America during the Great Recession was more 
widely felt among this racial demographic. Moreover, whereas whites and Hispanics in 
rural labor markets witnessed increases in their total low and high-skill employment, 
rural blacks experienced a decline here as well (of four percent and seven percent, 
respectively). Increases in low-skill employment among rural Hispanics (a 23 percent rise 
since 2006—or 72,500 jobs) took place at a rate nearly three times than that of whites— 
who experienced an increase of just under eight percent (a total gain of 246,000 jobs). 
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High-skill work among rural Hispanics also rose dramatically, by nearly 20 percent 
(26,000 jobs), compared to a four percent increase for whites (177,000 jobs). 
These trends were quite different in the suburbs, where the drop in middle-skill 
employment was just as dramatic for whites (a nine percent drop), significantly higher for 
Hispanics (a six percent drop), and nonexistent for blacks. Both suburban whites and 
Hispanics also experienced little change in their overall low-skill employment, whereas 
low-skill employment among blacks underwent a substantial increase of more than six 
percent (compared to just 1.6 percent for Hispanics and a half a percent decline for 
whites). Like those in rural America, suburban Hispanic employment in high-skill work 
rose by nearly 15 percent. The most dramatic increase for Hispanics and high-skill work, 
however, took place in urban labor markets, where the total number of high-skill 
Hispanic workers increased by 22 percent, followed by eight percent for whites and 
nearly 11 percent for urban blacks. Low-skill work also experienced a rise in urban areas, 
most noticeably for Hispanics (11 percent) and whites (8 percent). 
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Figure 14. Percent Changes in Total Low, Middle, and High-Skill 
Employment by Race and Residence, 2006-2009 
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An analysis of total low, middle, and high-skill industry employment by race and 
residence throughout the Great Recession can further reveal which industries have fared 
worst, but also which of these industries have retained (if not expanded) middle-skill 
employment, and for whom. Because low and high-skill workers appear to have fared 
quite well, while middle-skill work rampantly decreased, I focus here on total 
employment growth and decline in middle-skill jobs across racial and spatial lines. 
Percent changes with respect to middle-skill work across various industries (by race and 
residence) appear in Figures 15a, 15b, and 15c. Changes in total employment between 
these years are displayed in Table 23 in the appendix. 
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Figure 15a. Percent Change in Total Rural Middle-skill Jobs by 






I White • Black • Hispanic 
In rural America, as Figure 15a illustrates, there was little variability with respect 
to changes in middle-skill work among whites, blacks and Hispanics, with the exception 
of manufacturing work, which witnessed about a 25 percent decline among blacks and 
Hispanics and a 20 percent drop for whites. Middle-skill jobs in personal services, 
entertainment and recreation, and public administration industries were among the 
hardest hit for black and Hispanic workers, while the most dramatic decline among 
middle-skill white workers took place in the mining, construction, and manufacturing 
industries. At the same time, blacks experienced substantial middle-skill growth in 
agriculture (a 105 percent increase), mining (up nearly 70 percent) and business and 
repair industries (a 61 percent increase). Hispanics also witnessed growth in middle-skill 
business and repair work (an increase of over 50 percent), but also in the Transportation 
and Related Services industry (75 percent growth) and in Professional and Related 
Services (whose middle-skill work in this industry rose by a third since 2006). It was only 
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in the Personal Services and Public Administration industries that rural whites 
experienced growth in their access to middle-skill work during the Great Recession (with 
increases of 28 percent and 19 percent, respectively), though these changes were far less 
extensive than the gains witnessed by black and Hispanic workers. 
Figure 15b. Percent Change in Total Suburban Middle-skill Jobs 
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Changes in middle-skill work by industry were far more comparable among 
whites, blacks and Hispanics in the suburbs. That is, where one group witnessed a decline 
(or increase), so did others. Just as in rural America, the Great Recession took a 
significant toll on all workers in the Manufacturing industry, with losses ranging from 
about twenty percent for whites and blacks to a ten percent drop for Hispanics. 
Construction and Agriculture, too, were severely hit. The housing-bubble burst and the 
mortgage crisis clearly had their most dramatic influence on construction work in the 
suburbs, with this industry's middle-skill work declining a third for blacks, more than a 
quarter for Hispanics and 22 percent for whites. In total, the construction industry lost 1.3 
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million middle-skill jobs between 2006 and 2009, while manufacturing lost nearly 1.1 
million of such jobs. 
Although agriculture also lost a vast amount of its middle-skill jobs, this drop was 
more widely experienced by suburban blacks, whose rate of decline in this industry (over 
two-thirds) was more than triple that of whites (a 21 percent drop) and more than four 
times that of Hispanics. Thus, unlike their rural counterparts, who saw a considerable 
increase in middle-skill agriculture work, suburb blacks in this industry were quite 
vulnerable to the current economic downturn. While the percent decline for suburban 
blacks in these jobs was quite drastic, however, it should be noted that in terms of total 
jobs lost, these agriculture occupations totaled only 6,200. They made significant gains, 
however, in Mining (a 15 percent increase), Transportation & Communication (26 
percent), and Personal Service industries (27 percent). It was only in Mining that 
suburban whites experienced any growth in middle-skill work, at a rate of 15 percent. 
Middle-skill work for Hispanics, on the other hand, decreased in the Mining industry 
(with a drop of seven percent), but increased substantially in Transportation, 
Communication & Other Utilities (by 29 percent) and in Public Administration (by 25 
percent). 
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Figure 15c. Percent Change in Total Urban Middle-skill Jobs by 
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In urban labor markets, Construction and Manufacturing were also hard hit, 
though much less so in comparison to such work in suburban America. The racial trends 
in such drops, however, remained the same, with black workers faring worst (a 27 
percent drop in Construction and a 23 percent drop in Manufacturing) and whites being 
the least hard hit (with losses of 7 percent in Construction and 14 percent in 
Manufacturing). Interestingly, Personal Services remained the single industry in urban 
America where whites, blacks and Hispanics experienced comparable rates of growth in 
middle-skill work, though these rates were higher for blacks and Hispanics (about a 60 
percent increase) than for whites (about a 23 percent rise). 
By the end of the Great Recession, total employment had dropped by nearly two 
percent (see Figure 13), with rural blacks being the most vulnerable, witnessing a 12 
percent drop in overall employment (see Figure 14 and Table 21). This drop should not 
overshadow the fact that whites witnessed significant drops in total employment, as did 
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Hispanics (though the latter at lesser rates). Most importantly, the effects of the Great 
Recession were most widely felt among middle-skill workers, lending evidence to the 
theory that the current economic decline is, in large part, an expediting of the economic 
restructuring that US labor markets have been undergoing since the late 1960s. 
Figure 16. Percent Changes in Low, Middle and High-Skill 
Employment by Industry, 2006-2009 
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As Figure 16 (and Table 24) clearly illustrates, no industries experienced 
significant losses in low or high-skill work (with the exception of Manufacturing, which 
has been declining as a whole since the 1970s). Overall, only the Personal Service 
industry experienced a considerable rise in middle-skill work (which includes 
occupations like Licensed Practical Nurses, Salespersons not elsewhere classified, and 
Hotel Clerks). 
Among the most surprising trends uncovered amid the current recession is the 
impact of gender on unemployment risk, with women entering US labor markets at 
greater rates since 2007 (see Smith 2010). Not only have women been far less susceptible 
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to the effects of the Great Recession, but many have also had to seek employment as their 
spouses either lose their jobs or experience cuts in income. Figure 17 below illustrates 
this gender gap in employment, wherein men have experienced a drop of 4 percent in 
their total workforce representation, whereas women underwent marginal growth. 
Figure 17. Percent Changes in Men and Women's Total 
Employment by Skill-Level, 2006 to 2009 
Men Women ' 
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Differences in terms of industry of employment likely explain women's greater 
prevalence of maintaining (and gaining) employment in comparison to men. The starkest 
gender difference has taken place in low-skill work—a difference of more than five 
percentage points (see Figure 17), with women filling such jobs at a rate 14 times that of 
men. Men and women's employment by industry and skill-level appear in Figures 18a 
and 18b. Notice men's overrepresentation in such industries as Manufacturing and 
Construction, whereas women tend to be relegated to those industries that were the least 
hit, though they also tend to be overrepresented in the low-skill jobs of such industries as 
well (including Personal Services and Profession & Related Services). 
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Figure 18a. Men's Share of Low, Middle, and High-Skill 
Employment by Industry, 2006 
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Figure 18b. Women's Share of Low, Middle, and High-Skill 
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It is clear that women's underrepresentation in middle-skill employment helped to 
buffer them economically during America's Great Recession. At the same time, however, 
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their lessened susceptibility to unemployment was partly due to their overrepresentation 
in low-skill work—that which is also likely correlated with low pay, irregular hours and 
few benefits. Moreover, the data at hand cannot speak to whether women were able to 
retain employment in their current low-skill occupations or moved from one job to the 
next. These gender differences also varied across racial and spatial lines as displayed in 
figures 19a and 19b below. 
Figure 19a. Percent Changes in Men's Low, Middle, and High-Skill 
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Figure 19b. Percent Changes in Women's Low, Middle, and 
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Low-skill work expanded quite differently for men and women. For instance, 
though Hispanics clearly witnessed the greatest increase in this type of employment, its 
expansion in rural America took place at a rate for Hispanic men double that of Hispanic 
women (31 percent and 15 percent, respectively). In urban labor markets, low-skill 
growth among Hispanic women was more than ten times that of Hispanic men. White 
women's growing rate of low-skill work in these urban areas was also three times that of 
white men. In rural America, white women's influx into low-skill work was double the 
rate of white men. Black men and women alike experienced shrinking rates of low-skill 
work in rural areas, however, and the rate of decline among black women here was 
double that of black men. In the suburbs, black workers of both sexes experienced growth 
in low-skill work, though again women's growth rate in such employment was double 
that of men. On the other hand, black men experienced an eight-percent drop in low-skill 
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work in urban America, whereas black women experienced nearly eight-percent growth, 
a trend that helps to illustrate women's overall overrepresentation in such work. 
For the most part, both men and women experienced a decline in middle-skill 
work, regardless of their race or residence. There are exceptions to this pattern, though, as 
rural Hispanic and suburban black women witnessed four-percent increases in their rates 
of middle-skill employment. These exceptions mark the only increase in middle-skill 
work across race, residence, and gender lines during the recession. Unlike their suburban 
counterparts, who also witnessed notable increases in their rates of low and high-skill 
work, rural blacks in middle-skill jobs were clearly the hardest hit among women. The 
same is true of middle-skill black men in rural America, although their decline is much 
more comparable (though slightly higher) than middle-skill white men. As noted earlier, 
rural blacks—regardless of their type of skilled employment—experienced a decline 
across the board. Thus, blacks are the only racial/residential group to feel the constraints 
of the Great Recession across all forms of employment. Though this is true of both 
gender groups, the decline is much greater among black women, whose rate of decline 
was roughly double that of black men. 
Interestingly, whereas overall high-skill growth among blacks took place in the 
suburbs between 1990 and 2006, these opportunities (for both black men and women) 
were most readily found in urban areas during the Great Recession. Here, black men and 
women in high-skill work experienced increases in such employment of 8.6 percent and 
11.9 percent, respectively. Whites and Hispanics also witnessed the greatest increases in 
high-skill employment between 2006 and 2009 in urban America, with the exception of 
Hispanic males, whose presence in rural high-skill work expanded by more than a third 
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(compared to just under a quarter in urban areas and 15 percent in the suburbs). Hispanic 
women made substantial gains in high-skill work in all three areas, greatest in urban 
America (an increase of one-fifth), followed by the suburbs (15 percent) and lowest in 
rural America (eight percent). For white men, growing rates of high-skill work were 
similar in both rural and urban areas (a roughly five percent increase), and remained 
relatively unchanged in the suburbs, where white women's high-skill work grew by 
nearly six percent, a rate slightly exceeded by urban women (a ten percent increase). 
The influence of the Great Recession has not been felt equally, and what growth 
has taken place appears to have occurred only in low and high-skill sectors, with middle-
skill workers (especially those in manufacturing and construction industries, but also 
rural black females) typically experiencing declines in such employment. Rural black 
workers of both sexes are the only demographic groups to experience declines in all types 
of employment—a trend more apparent among black women than black men. 
93 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
The past three years have shepherded radical changes for middle-skill workers, 
white and nonwhite alike. Just as importantly, the data presented above provide us with a 
greater understanding of the demographic and geographic distribution of low, middle and 
high-skill employment across the US. As hypothesized, compared to whites, Hispanics 
and blacks are the less likely to occupy high-skilled occupations, and are overrepresented 
in low-skill employment. While Hispanics are also more likely to be found within 
middle-skill employment, blacks tend to hold these jobs at a rate similar to whites. 
Hispanics remain the least likely to hold high-skill employment. 
Furthermore, rural residents in general are more likely than their urban and 
suburban counterparts to hold low-skill employment—a trend more prominent for 
nonwhites. These numbers have fallen dramatically for older low-skill black workers, 
however. Although it was hypothesized that gains in high-skill labor in were most likely 
to be reported among suburban residents, no matter their race, this is true only of workers 
when examined as a whole. Suburban blacks and Hispanics are more likely than their 
rural and urban counterparts to hold high-skill work, while among whites it is those 
residing in urban areas who are most likely to report holding such jobs. 
It is less surprising that blacks and Hispanics, given their educational histories and 
higher rates of residential and labor-market segregation, are more likely to be found in 
low-skill employment. With respect to moving out of low-skill employment and further 
up the economic ladder, blacks appear substantially ahead of their Hispanic counterparts. 
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Whereas the percent of blacks in high-skill employment increased from 1990 to 2006, the 
percent of Hispanics in high-skill employment remained at 14 percent—the lowest of any 
racial group. 
The majority of blacks' gains in high-skill employment are credited to those in 
suburban areas—a finding that speaks to a trend within the black community that Wilson 
(1978) first touched on more than three decades ago: the potential for a growing gap 
between the black underclass and a relatively well-off, college-educated subset of the 
black population. As Wilson notes, "Poor blacks are particularly vulnerable to changes in 
the economy beyond racial considerations...changes [that] have had a profound impact 
on the job market in central cities" (ibid: 171). The fact that urban whites are to be found 
in high-skill jobs at a rate nearly two-hundred percent greater than urban blacks (42 
percent vs. 22 percent) speaks not only to the plight of inner-city America, but also to the 
daily struggle that has developed under the reign such economic depravity (see Anderson 
2000). It is in suburban America that whites and nonwhites have found relatively equal 
access to high-skill employment, where whites are only 22 percent more likely than 
blacks to be found in high-skill labor (33 percent vs. 27 percent). 
It was within these suburban labor markets that Hispanics found in-roads to high-
skill employment as well. On the other hand, white workers' gains took place largely in 
urban centers. Future research should consider whether differences in the types of 
industries in which urban whites and nonwhites find employment help to explain this 
phenomenon, and whether gender has any bearing on this trend. If these industry-
differences exist, urban policymakers and education administrators might be able to 
implement policies and programs that could lessen the urban racial divide in high-skill 
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employment. Across the board, however, Hispanics and blacks alike require more 
progress in terms of catching up to whites with respect to their distribution in high-skill 
employment. If the negative effects of the current economic crisis—most widely felt 
among those in the middle—fail to recede, then black and Hispanic workers will face 
even greater setbacks. 
Again, though, it appears that at least some blacks were able to follow the well-
paying jobs out of the cities and into the expanding suburbs. While such a trend likely 
reflects the growing concentration of these jobs outside city centers, it might also speak 
to the lessening of black immobility that covert residential segregation has amplified 
(Massey and Denton 1993). Moreover, the influence of labor market discrimination also 
appears to have waned somewhat, as witnessed by the dramatic decline of older blacks 
found in low-skill employment, particularly in rural America. These changes in high-skill 
employment might also help to explain some of the shrinking (until recently) differences 
in wealth between blacks and whites (see Shapiro 2004). 
Findings with respect to a potential labor market bifurcation (1990 to 2006, 
specifically) are mixed. While middle-skill work declined, low-skill work did not 
necessarily fill the bulk of the void left behind by the dissipation of middle-skill work. 
Rather, high-skill work saw impressive increases, particularly for women and black men. 
Women in US labor markets also experienced the most dramatic declines in middle-skill 
work during the last twenty years, though in 1990 they were already much less likely than 
men to be found in these jobs. Since 1990, and even throughout the course of the Great 
Recession, low and high-skill work became more common throughout the US, and black 
and Hispanic workers have not been disproportionately relegated to low-skill work since 
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this time, with blacks in particular increasing their share of high-skill work at dramatic 
rates (see Tables 7 and 8 in the appendix). 
The Great Recession took its toll on all US workers. By 2009, the percent 
employed in middle-skill sectors had dropped by more than three percentage points since 
2006—a staggering decrease, considering that between 2000 and 2005 it had dropped 
only 1.4 percentage points. Middle-skill job losses overall during this period were most 
prevalent among whites, a nine-percent drop, followed by a six-percent drop for blacks 
and five percent for Hispanics. Along race, gender and residence lines, however, hardest 
hit were rural black females—a finding that reflects the combined influence of race and 
gender in terms of economic marginality—whereas black men in rural America 
witnessed a drop in middle-skill labor on par with that of rural white men. This finding 
highlights rural America's continued susceptibility to economic turmoil, as well as the 
need for future research to examine the tenuous nature of employment among rural 
women of color. Rural Hispanic women, however, along with suburban black women, 
were the only workers along race and gender lines to experience an increase in middle-
skill employment (both of less than five percent). Like their rural counterparts, Hispanics 
across the US appear to have fared quite well during the recession in comparison to 
whites and blacks. Their declines in middle-skill work were marginal in urban and 
suburban labor markets, and they even experienced an increase in such work in rural 
regions. 
What is more, although middle-skill work declined by more than six percentage 
points from 1990 to 2006, the majority of the void was filled by high-skill work (an 
increase of four percentage points) rather than low-skill labor (which rose only 2 
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percentage points). Although the Great Recession has expedited these labor-market 
changes, with middle-skill work declining by about one percentage point per year since 
the start of the crisis, high-skill work's growth continued to outpace that of low-skill. A 
next step would be to utilize multivariate models to predict skill by race while controlling 
for a while variety of factors, including not only residence and gender, but also age, 
industry, region and education. 
If middle-skill labor continues to decline as rapidly as it has during the Great 
Recession, America might face an expansion of racial inequality—especially in rural 
regions and urban cores. Although there is much disparity in terms of men and women's 
employment in middle-skill work, a great deal of racial parity persists within middle-skill 
employment, with rates of such work being virtually distributed equally across racial 
lines. What is more, women's greater rate of low-skill work, though a troubling trend, 
might help in explaining Bonilla-Silva's (2010) finding that "working-class women are 
the most likely candidates to be racial progressives...who recognize the significance of 
discrimination in the United States" (p. 132). Women's shared labor market experiences 
with nonwhites (chiefly their overrepresentation in low-skill work) might indeed help to 
foster the racial amity to which Bonilla-Silva's analysis speaks. 
Although a number of research questions arise from these findings, two are 
particularly pressing. First, the extent to which nonwhites are able to draw upon various 
sources of capital (including economic, human, social and cultural) to garner employment 
compared to whites requires further examination. This research could provide further 
insight into nonwhites' consistently higher-than-average unemployment rates. 
Researchers should also consider how historically driven differences in terms of access to 
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such capital allows some workers to buffer themselves against downward social mobility 
in comparison to workers of color. Second, US race relations have taken a particularly 
interesting turn during the past several decades, with whites becoming more likely to 
consider themselves a marginalized group (Jones and Cox 2010). Thus, future research 
would do well to consider the everyday lived experiences that underlie such attitudes. 
Bridging the present race-relations divide could also assist in eliminating the stark 
economic inequality that remains apparent along racial lines. 
Finally, role of residence appears secondary to race in explaining the demographic 
distribution of skilled employment, although more in-depth statistical analyses are 
necessary to determine the extent to which this is the case. Moreover, the data here speak 
to where low, middle, and high-skill workers live, not necessarily where their jobs are 
located, though the two are likely highly correlated. This analytical limitation does not 
confound the overall story uncovered here, however. That is, the racial composition of 
the labor market has changed rapidly since the latter half of the twentieth century, in spite 
of the many barriers faced by nonwhites. If the ground gained by this subset of the 
population in the last two decades is any indication, the color of labor will continue to 
change. The rate at which it will do so—particularly given the effects of the current 
recession—remains to be seen. 
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Table 8. Men and Women's Shares of Low, Middle, and High-Skill Employment 





















































































Table 9. Percentage Point Changes in Low, Middle, and High-Skill Employment 












































































Table 10. Percent of Men and Women in Low, Middle and 
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Table 13. Percent Employed in Low, Middle, and High-Skill Work by 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 14. Percent Changes in Low, Middle and High-Skill 
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Table 17. Suburban Workers Shares of Low, Middle, and High-Skill Employment by Race 



































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 18. Urban Workers Shares of Low, Middle, and High-Skill Employment by Race & 
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Table 21. Total Employment in Low, Middle, and High-Skill Labor by Residence 
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Table 23. Percent Change in Total Low, Middle, and High-Skill 
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